THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION
DAVID MILLON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

While apparently metaphysical questions about "the nature of the
corporation" might strike one as vaguely continental and surely alien to
our hard-headed, pragmatic legal culture, theorizing about "what corporations are" has in fact occupied a great deal of home-grown mental energy and has played an important role in arguments about concrete
questions of corporate law. My goal in this Essay is to consider how
theories of the corporation have developed and changed over the last
hundred and fifty years. Based on this survey, I offer some observations
about the role of such theories in discourse about corporate law and corporate activity.
Much of the attention given this subject, both by past theorists and
recent commentators, focuses on developments in two dimensions. The
first dimension is the distinction between the corporation as an entity,
with a real existence separate from its shareholders and other participants, and the corporation as a mere aggregation of natural individuals
without a separate existence. The second dimension is the distinction
between the corporation as an artificial creation of state law and the corporation as a natural product of private initiative.
In addition to these distinctions there is a third dichotomy that has
received a good deal less attention, a public/private distinction. This
third distinction has operated at a deeper level, explicitly and implicitly
structuring thought about the nature of corporate activity and the appropriate goals of corporate law. According to one view, corporate activity
has broad social and political ramifications that justify a body of corporate law that is deliberately responsive to public interest concerns. The
alternative viewpoint portrays corporate law as governing little more
than the private relations between the shareholders of the corporation
and management, which acts as their agents or trustees.1 Under the first
view, corporate law takes on an external perspective, paying explicit regard to the relations between the corporation and the rest of society. The
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. The author gratefully acknowledges the insights of Lyman Johnson, the financial support of the Frances Lewis Law Center,
Washington and Lee University, and the suggestions of Jim Cox, Thomas Hazen, and Tony Taibi.
1. As used in this Essay, the terms "management" or "managers" refer collectively to the
corporation's board of directors and senior officers.
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opposing view conceives of corporate law's focus as internal, dealing primarily with the governance problems that arise inside the corporation.
This view would leave to other bodies of law (e.g., labor, antitrust,
debtor-creditor law) the task of regulating the corporation's external relationships. Thus, the difference is between a public law, regulatory conception of corporate law on the one hand, and a private law, internal
perspective on the other. 2
Historically, the political implications of the natural/artificial and
entity/aggregate distinctions have been ambiguous, meaning different
things at different times. The abidingly crucial issue in corporate legal
theory has been the public/private distinction. Whether corporate law is
thought to be one or the other reflects a choice between a body of law
concerned solely with the techniques of shareholder wealth-maximization or, instead, a body of law that embraces and seeks to promote a
richer array of social and political values.
In Part II of this essay, I survey how during various periods in our
legal history these sets of distinctions have been combined in differing
ways. During much of the 19th century, the idea of the corporation as
an artificial entity characterized corporate legal discourse. 3 This view
perceived the corporation as an entity, rather than an aggregation, and
emphasized the state's constitutive role. The latter idea, in particular,
was interpreted to justify a public law approach to corporate law. Thus,
for example, corporate law imposed various regulations designed to address important public concerns relating to the economic privilege and
power that incorporation implied.
By the last decades of the 19th century, commentators noted the
decline in the state's use of its chartering authority to impose substantive
regulations on corporate activity and argued that corporations were
nothing but aggregations of private individuals (analogous in this regard
to partnerships). These theorists sought an anti-regulatory conception of
corporate law that protected the financial interests of shareholders from
any special restrictions on their property rights. The aggregate characterization did not prove to be persuasive, but the notion of the corporation as a natural creation of private initiative and market forces replaced
the idea that the corporation was artificial. The natural entity theory
2. Of course, one can readily deconstruct the public/private distinction for critical purposes.
See generally Symposium on the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982). In

using the terms "public" and "private" in this essay, I aim only to suggest the ways in which the
distinction has been used to structure thinking about the appropriate content of corporate law. For a

discussion of the role of the public/private distinction in relation to corporate liability, see Stone,
Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/PrivateDistinctionsMatter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV.

1441 (1982).
3. See infra Part II.A.
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then was interpreted to imply the same private law, anti-regulatory,
shareholder-centered program that the aggregate theorists had advocated.4 This theory of the corporation, as Morton Horwitz argues, contributed to the legitimation of newly emergent big business in the .early
years of this century. 5
Just as the natural entity theory had achieved dominance, advocates
of corporate social responsibility seized on that theory in the wake of the
Depression and used it as a basis for arguments in favor of a corporate
citizenship idea.6 Emphasizing the natural entity theory's distinction between the corporate entity and its shareholders, these commentators argued, first, that management represented the corporation (and the
shareholders only indirectly), and, second, that the corporation, like any
other natural person, should enjoy the freedom to act as a socially responsible citizen. Accordingly, management ought to be able to take the
corporation's public responsibilities into account, even if corporate profitability (and shareholder welfare) would suffer as a result. The response
to this argument was not to reinterpret the natural entity theory in a new
way that would foreclose the corporate citizenship claim, but rather, during the 1930s, to reconceptualize the corporation as an aggregation of its
shareholders for whom management acted as'trustee. 7 In this way, defenders of a shareholder-centered, privatized vision of corporate activity
and corporate law were able to defeat claims about corporate social responsibility. At least until recently, this theory of the corporation has
continued to wield that power.8 In its most recent incarnation, the private aggregation idea has assumed the garb'of neoclassical economics
under the "corporation as a nexus of contracts" rubric. 9 Advocates of
this theory have used the freedom-of-contract metaphor to support their
shareholder primacy, anti-regulatory policy objectives.
With the public controversy generated. by the explosion of hostile
takeover activity during the 1980s, we again are witnessing debate about
theories of the corporation. 10 Responding to widespread concerns about
the harsh impact of hostile takeovers on target company employees and
others, state legislatures, courts, and commentators have focused on the
notion of the corporation as aggregation, defined broadly to include not
just shareholders and management but also other participants in the
4. See infra Part II.B.1.
5. See Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REv. 173, 174 (1985). For discussion of Horwita' views, see infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.2.
7. See infra Part II.C.l.
8. See infra Part II.C.2.
9. See infra Part II.C.3.
10. See infra Part II.D.
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corporate enterprise. This broader conception serves to justify corporate
law reforms responsive to the interests of these various non-shareholder,
non-management constituencies. Opponents of regulation that impinges
on shareholders' financial interest in unimpeded access to takeover bids
(regardless of impact on non-shareholders) have responded with arguments based on their nexus-of-contracts interpretation of the corporate
aggregation, but their efforts have proved to be unpersuasive in the legislatures and courts.
In Part III of this essay, I address the significance of theories of the
corporation, focusing primarily on Horwitz' argument about the determinate normative implications of particular legal theories and their role
in the legitimation of legal doctrine and social practice." My starting
point is agreement with Horwitz that the various theories of the corporation that have enjoyed prominence since the 19th century have influenced thinking about how the law should treat corporate activity. At
any point in time, particular theories of the corporation are perceived to
justify particular legal rules or, at a more general level, a particular approach to regulation of business activity. These legal theories are based
on positive or descriptive assertions about the world-assertions about
what corporations are. In a characteristic form of legal argument, normative implications then are said to follow from the positive assertion.
However, at the same time that theory is influencing doctrine, theories of
the corporation themselves are influenced strongly by legal doctrine defining the corporation's attributes. The relationship between legal theories of the corporation and corporate doctrine is thus dynamic and
interdependent: Each simultaneously influences the other. Our ideas
about what corporations are provide us with a critical perspective toward
corporate doctrine, while our interpretation of corporate doctrine reveals
what appears to be essential or characteristic of corporations.
Thus, in Part III, I first discuss briefly Horwitz' claim that a particular theory of the corporation, the natural entity theory, legitimated the
rise of big business in the early 20th century. 12 I argue that the legitimation claim is more complex than Horwitz indicates because of the interdependent relationship among corporate theory, legal doctrine, and
social practice. Because beliefs about the descriptive validity and normative implications of a particular theory are influenced partially by doctrine and actual practice, it is too simplistic to assert that theory
legitimates doctrine and practice as if in a one-way direction. I then consider Horwitz' argument that theories of the corporation (and legal con11. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 221-22.
12. See infra Part III.A.
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cepts generally) have "determinate significance." 1 3 His claim is that, in
particular historical contexts, theories have a normative tendency or
"tilt" and therefore are not infinitely manipulable. I suggest that Horwitz implicitly relies on a conventionalist explanation for the determinate
meaning of legal concepts. Although this explanation offers useful insights into the role of legal theories in the past, I caution against misunderstanding what conventionalism has to say about the determinate
meaning of legal concepts. There are important ways in which legal concepts, even from a conventionalist perspective, are indeterminate, leaving
a great deal of room for the creative deployment of rhetoric and political
vision in argument over the actual and potential content of corporate
law.
In Part IV of this Essay I discuss in some detail a recent development that exemplifies the creative use of legal theory to reshape corporate doctrine, Chancellor William Allen's opinion in the important Time
case.1 4 I offer a reading of the opinion as suggestive of a way to address
the public's interest in how hostile takeovers are resolved that does not
depend on one's views about the entity/aggregate, natural/artificial nature of corporations. Under this reading, the opinion seems to focus directly on the public impact of hostile takeovers and uses this aspect as the
criterion against which doctrine should be evaluated. In this novel approach to the hostile takeover problem, we may witness a reemergence of
the idea that corporate law is "public" law-that is, a body of law concerned with much more than simply the "private," internal relationship
between shareholders and management. In offering this reading, I make
no claims about Allen's authorial intent. Rather, my interpretation is an
example of the essentially creative activity that constitutes controversy
over the meaning of legal ideas and ultimately determines their meaning.
II.

A.

THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 15

The 19th Century

From the early years of the 19th century, certain legal attributes of
incorporation encouraged Americans to conceive of the corporation as
13. See infra Part III.B.

14. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 (Del. 1990).
15. Parts A and B.1 of this Section draw heavily on the following works: J. HuRsr, THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970

(1970); Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectivesfrom History, 41
STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton, New Economic Theory]; Bratton, The "Nexus of
Contracts" Corporation: A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton,
CriticalAppraisal]; Dewey, The HistoricBackground of Corporate Legal Personality,35 YALE L.J.
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an entity existing separately from its shareholders and other participants.
In some respects, the corporation could be viewed as a legal person existing separately from the aggregation of shareholders who owned and
controlled it. Thus, in the Dartmouth College case, Chief Justice Marshall referred to the corporation as "an artificial being, invisible [and]
intangible" and to its "individuality," as being evident in such features as
its power to sue and amenity to suit and its durational existence defined
without regard to the lives of its shareholders. 16 Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames's influential treatise similarly described the legal features of a
corporation as a "body, created by law, ... for certain purposes, considered as a natural person."'1 7 The idea of the corporation as an entity is
also apparent in courts' routine statutory construction of the term "per18
sons" to include corporate as well as natural persons.
The corporate entity was considered artificial, in the sense that the
corporation owed its existence to the positive law of the state rather than
to the private initiative of individual incorporators. This idea was most
clearly evident in the practice of requiring a special act of the state legislature for each instance of incorporationl19 Increasingly during the latter
half of the 19th century, states began to replace special chartering with
general incorporation laws. These statutes (the ancestors of present corporate statutes) dispensed with the need for a special act of the legislature, instead making corporate charters available simply upon
compliance with certain generally applicable filing requirements and submission to standardized substantive regulations. Even so, the requirement of a state-granted charter continued to reinforce the idea that
corporations (in contrast to unincorporated business associations such as
general partnerships) were artificial creations of the state.
655 (1926); Horwitz, supra note 5; Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation In
American Law, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 1441 (1987); Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of
Corporation Law?, 45 WASH, & LEE L. REv. 903 (1988).

16. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636-37 (1819).
17. J. ANGELL & S.AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREOATE

1 (10th ed. 1875).
18. See eg., Loudon v. Coleman, 59 Ga. 653, 655 (1877) (corporation falls within statute covering "[a]ny machinest" since, despite incapability of being a machinest in the strict sense, the law
treats a corporation as a person); People v. Assessors of Watertown, I Hill 616, 620-21 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1841) (corporation considered a person; banking associations permitted to sue or to be sued in
the corporate name); Fisher v. Horicon Iron &.Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351, 355 (1860) (corporation
considered a person within meaning of Mill Dam Act of 1839, 1838 Wis. Laws 98, which substituted
statutory remedy for common law remedy for "damages occasioned by the erection of dams, and

flowage of land").
19. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188-91 (2d ed. 1985) (legislatures granted charters "by statute, one by one" in early 19th century, thus making each charter
"tailor made to the case at hand").
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The dependence of corporate status on state action was the vehicle
through which 19th-century Americans pursued important public policy
objectives. At least through the mid-19th century, incorporation primarily for private business objectives was relatively unusual. Instead, the
typical corporation was chartered to pursue some sort of public function.
These corporations included charitable and municipal corporations as
well as privately-owned banking, insurance, and public utility enterprises. 20 Even after incorporation replaced the partnership as the standard form of organization for manufacturing and other routine business
ventures, the idea persisted that the state conferred the privileges of incorporation not simply for the private benefit of the incorporators, but
also to further the general welfare. The primary public policy justification was the business corporation's utility as a "socially useful instru'2 1
ment of economic growth.
Particularly indicative of the public aspect of corporate legal theory
were the extensive efforts to regulate the corporation's relationship to the
rest of society. While reflecting a belief in the social utility of the corporate form, the increasingly common use of incorporation to pursue private entrepreneurial objectives simultaneously generated suspicion and
hostility. One reason for such sentiment was the association of corporate
status with special privilege. 22 Americans feared that the grant of a corporate charter to pursue a particular line of business was a denial of opportunity to others who also might have sought to-enter that market. A
second, more important, reason for suspicion and hostility was the perception that grants of corporate status threatened the balance of economic power in American society. 23 Incorporation appeared to offer
opportunities for the accumulation and entrenchment of wealth that
would be otherwise unattainable. Such economic power was potentially
harmful to consumers, workers, and anyone else forced to deal with the
corporation. And, more ominously, economic power would generate
political power that would be exercised in ways contrary to the public
24
interest.
In response to concerns about equal opportunity, states rarely denied requests for special charterg and generally refused to confer monopoly privileges.25 Further, courts construed charters narrowly, refusing to
20. See J. HuRsr, supra note 15, dt 1 -18.
21. Id. at 47.
22. Id. at 33-36.

23. Id. at 36-47.
24. See id. at, 30-47. For a more general discussion of concerns about the balance of economic
power in 19th-century law and political economy, see Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of
Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219 (1988).
.
25. J. HuRsT, supra note 15, at 35, 46.
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find rights to monopoly by implication. 2 6 Nevertheless, persistent public
suspicion about favoritism and corruption in the granting of corporate
charters led some critics to advocate abolition of incorporation altogether.27 Some states sought to defuse concerns about corruption of the
legislators through constitutional provisions requiring a two-thirds legislative majority in favor of the granting of a charter.28 The more widely
favored solution was to enact general incorporation laws. By dispensing
with the need for a special legislative act and instead ordaining simple
procedures that could be followed by anyone seeking to incorporate,
these laws eliminated legislative discretion and thereby did away with the
danger of monopolistic privilege gained through legislative favoritism.
In this way, general incorporation laws addressed-equality of opportunity
concerns.
The ready availability of corporate status also addressed balance of
power concerns by seeking to ensure that small numbers of corporations
would not dominate the economic landscape. Not only did general incorporation statutes remove legislative entry barriers, but competition
among many corporations would prevent any single firm from achieving
monopoly power.29 States did not rely solely on the market to regulate
corporate size, however. They also imposed regulations specially
designed to prevent accumulation of dangerous economic power.30 Special charters generally contained specific limitations on the corporation's
purposes and powers, so as to restrict the lawful scope of corporate activity. Also typical were limits on the amount of capitalization and dura31
tional existence.
The pervasive adoption of general incorporation statutes by many
states during the latter half of the 19th century did not signal abdication
of the regulatory notion of corporate law. Some states continued to insist
that corporate charters include specific limitations on corporate purposes
and powers, and although others began to allow incorporation for the
purpose of "carrying on any lawful business" as early as the 1870s, 32
26. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 54849 (1837) (corporate charter issued for Charles River Bridge was to be strictly construed so as to
permit construction of Warren Bridge across the Charles River).
27. See J. HURST, supra note 15, at 33-36, 136 (describing critics' view); M. MEYERS, THE
JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLrrIcs AND BELIEF 201 (1957).
28. See, eg., DEL. CONsr. OF 1831, art. 2, § 17 (Delaware requires two-thirds vote of each
branch of legislature for act of incorporation); N.Y. CONST. OF 1822, art. 7, § IX.
29. For a discussion of.classical economic ideas about market competition, see Millon, supra
note 24, at 1264-71.
30. J. HURST, supra note 15, at 37-41.
31. Id. at 44-45.
32. Act of Feb. 3, 1876, ch. 65, § 1, 1876 Me. Laws 51; Act of Apr. 14, 1874, ch. 165, § 1, 1874
Mass. Acts 109; Act of June 21, 1875, ch. 611, § 1, 1875 N.Y. Laws 755.
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most corporate charters continued to specify particular purposes long after they were required to do so. 3 3 Some states were willing to allow incorporation only for a single purpose, 34 and the courts construed
narrowly limitations on corporate purposes and powers.35 Moreover,
during the course of the 19th century, courts developed an extensive
body of common law governing corporate acts that exceeded the powers
conferred by the state. The ultra vires doctrine provided that a corporation could not bind itself contractually concerning a matter that was beyond the objectives defined in its charter.3 6 Even unanimous shareholder
approval could not validate an ultra vires act because the shareholders
could not create powers not conferred by the state. The limitations on
corporate purpose and the ultra vires doctrine continued to reflect distrust of corporate power and the desire to constrain the corporation's
ability to accumulate socially threatening economic power.
The states also used general incorporation acts to restrict the economic power of corporations in other ways. Of particular importance

were prohibitions on ownership of stock of other corporations-restrictions that directly addressed concerns about corporate consolidation and

concentration of wealth. As a result, holding companies and parent-subsidiary acquisitions were precluded. 37 General incorporation statutes
33. See H. BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 198 (1927).
34. A., BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 131 n.5

(1932).
35. See, eg., Chewacla Lime Works v. Dismukes, Frierson & Co., 87 Ala. 344, 6 So. 122
(1889) (company chartered to mine, manufacture, and sell product has no implied or incidental
power to carry on general retail business); Day v. Spiral Springs Buggy Co., 57 Mich. 146, 23 N.W.
628 (1885) (buyer not permitted to prevail on breach of contract claim because contract involved
buyer in activity that went beyond buyer's corporate charter); People ex reL Tiffany & Co. v. Campbell, 144 N.Y. 166, 38 N.E. 990 (1894) (purchase of goods from foreign manufacturer to resell not
within the powers of a corporation chartered to manufacture and sell gold and silverware); Powell v.
Murray, 3 A.D. 273, 276, 38 N.Y.S. 233, 235, (1896) ("charter ofa corporation-is the measure of its
power, and the enumeration of those powers implies the exclusion of all others"), aff'd mem, 157
N.Y. 717, 53 N.E. 1130 (1899).
36. The ultra vires doctrine was especially important in cases in which a corporation sought to
avoid liability for agreements that exceeded the corporation's lawful powers. Under the strict view
applied by the United States Supreme Court, any ultra vires transaction was void. See Thomas v.
Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 71, 77 (1880); Pearce v. Madison & Ind. R.R., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 441, 444
(1859). State courts, however, tended to-distinguish between partly and wholly executory contracts,
holding only the latter to be void. See, eg., Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N.Y. 62, 70 (1875)
(buyer cannot use ultra vires as a defense when contract is fully performed).
37. Several states initiated quo warranto proceedings against corporations that sought to evade
such prohibitions. See California v. American Sugar Ref. Co., No. 24381 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1890), reprinted in 7 RY?..& CORP. L. J. 83 (1890); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700,
46 N.W. 155 (1890) (action in quo warranto against monopolistic corporation); People v. North
River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890) (action in quo warranto to dissolve corporation organized as trust); People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N.E. 798 (1887) (action in
quo warranto to prevent monopolistic corporations).
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also imposed dollar limits on capitalization or asset value38 and dura-

39
tional limits on corporate existence.
In addition to general efforts to protect the public by limiting corporate power, states used corporate law to address the interests of particular constituencies vulnerable to corporate activity. Charters for banking,
transportation, and insurance companies contained special provisions
designed to protect the public from abusive practices (like inadequate
capital reserves or abusive rate structures) peculiar to each industry. 4°
General incorporation statutes also responded to creditors' concerns
about fraud and financial irresponsibility. The so-called "trust fund"
doctrine denied shareholders the full protection of limited liability by
holding them personally responsible in cases of insolvency to the extent
they had failed to pay full par value for their stock. 41 Statutes also provided safeguards designed to ensure that the corporation received full
value from the shareholder if stock was paid for by property rather than
by cash.42 Some states imposed "double liability" on shareholders until
43
all capital was contributed.
Solicitude for creditors extended not just to the interests of banks or
trade creditors. Many states provided special protection for employees, a
class of persons deemed particularly vulnerable to financial manipulation or irresponsibility. For example, a New York statute made shareholders "liable for all debts due and owing to any of [the corporation's]
laborers, servants or employees." 44 In short, as Horwitz notes, "the distinction between the liability of corporate shareholders and 'members' of
a corporation and partnership, so clear to modern eyes, was still regarded

38. See, eg., Act of Feb. 18, 1857, 1857 Ill. Laws 161 (limiting .amount of capital stock to
$500,000); Act of Mar. 19, 1855, ch. 68, §. 1, 1855 Mass. Acts 534 (same); Act of June 21, 1875, 1875
N.Y. Laws 755, ch. 611, § 11 ($2,000,000). For a comprehensive collection of references, see Liggett
Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-54 nn.5-26 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39. Nearly half the states retained limits of 20 to 50 years until as late as 1903. Liggett, 288
U.S. at 555 n.29 (citing REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATION LAWS OF MASSACHUSETrs

162-64 (1903)).
40. 3. HURST, supra note 15, at 39.
41. For the origin of this principle, see Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824)
(No. 17,944). See also Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610, 620 (1873) ("We think it now well
established that the capital stock of a corporation, especially its unpaid subscriptions, is a trust fund
for the benefit of the general creditors.").
42. See, eg., Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 106, § 48 (1882) (requiring that officers and majority of directors swear to value of property exchanged for stock and that commissioner of corporations approve
the valuation).
43. See, eg., Act of Feb. 17, 1848, ch. 40, 1848 N.Y. Laws 54 (making each stockholder severally liable to creditors for an amount equal to the amount of stock held for all debts and contracts
until the whole amount of capital was paid in).
44. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 57 (consol. 1909); see also Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 106, § 61 (1882).
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rather as a matter of degree than of kind throughout the nineteenth
century." 45
The insistence on externally focused regulatory objectives reflected
deep doubts about the impact of corporate activity on American society.
Thus, the idea of the corporation as an artificial creature of the state
provided the theoretical basis for a body of corporate law that explicitly
addressed the relationship between corporate activity and public welfare.
In this way, extensive regulation indicated a conception of corporate law
as public law.
B.

The Natural Entity Theory

1. The Triumph of the NaturalEntity Theory. In contrast to the
artificial entity theory that was characteristic of legal discourse for much
of the 19th century, the natural entity theory, which took hold in the
early years of this century, conceived of the corporation as the creation of
private initiative rather than state power. The reconceptualization of the
relation between the corporation and the state reflected a gradual rejection of the idea that the corporation is artificial in nature, in favor of an
explanation that emphasized the corporation's origin in the natural activities of private individuals. In response to new arguments about the aggregate nature of the corporation, attention to the relation between the
corporate enterprise and the shareholders resulted in a reaffirmation of
the corporation's entity character.
The conception of the corporation as an artificial creation entirely
dependent on the state for its powers gradually gave way to the view that
corporations are the natural products of individual initiative and possess
powers conferred by their constituent shareholders. Although the switch
to general incorporation statutes during the last third of the 19th century
could have been interpreted as a continuation of the states' traditional
constitutive and regulatory role in the creation of corporations, the
change in the role states played encouraged rethinking of the state's relation to its chartered corporations. The newer approach seemed to depart
from older assumptions in favor of a procedure that was merely facilitative, requiring compliance with a few procedural formalities and imposing relatively less significant substantive regulation. The general
incorporation acts initially included significant limitations on corporations' ability to grow and accumulate economic power,4 6 but, during the
45. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 184-85. Some states also held directors personally liable for dividend payments that rendered a corporation insolvent, for debts contracted while loans were outstanding to shareholders, for permitting debts to exceed capital, or for issuing stock in return for

overvalued property. See, eg., Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 106, § 61 (1882).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.

212

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1990:201

last years of the 19th century, state legislatures eliminated several significant restrictions. Most important, beginning with New Jersey in 1888, 4 7
state corporation laws gradually did away with proscriptions on stock
ownership by corporations, thus facilitating the creation of enormous
holding companies. In addition, capitalization limits were gradually
48
abolished.
During this era courts increasingly vitiated legal principles based on
a grant or concession theory of corporate powers. The decline of the
ultra vires idea most clearly reveals movement away from the artificial
entity concept of corporate power that was inherent in special chartering.4 9 As we have seen, traditional 19th-century theory insisted that corporations lacked any powers beyond those conferred by the legislature.50
As early as 1898, a treatise writer could state that the ultra vires doctrine
was "disappearing." 51 By the 1920s, most states accepted the view that a
corporation could not plead ultra vires in defense to a suit on a wholly or
even partly executed contract.5 2 Also rejected was the old rule prevent-'
ing shareholder validation of ultra vires conduct.53 These conclusions
implicitly denied that corporations possessed only such powers as the
state conferred on them. By 1930, the doctrine of ultra vires had attained
its present insignificance.54
Related to the ultra vires doctrine was the traditional rule that denied corporations the power to act beyond the borders of the states that
chartered them.55 Because their existence depended entirely upon state
law, corporations could have no power "where that law ceases to operate."'56 The United States Supreme Court rejected that doctrine in sev47. Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, 1888 N.J. Laws 385; Act of Apr. 7, 1888, ch. 295, 1888 N.J.

Laws 445.
48. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-54 & nn. 5-26 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(collected state statutes mandating capitalization limits).
49. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 186-88.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
51.

1 W. COOK, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING CAPITAL STOCK at vii-

viii (4th ed. 1898).
52. The United States Supreme Court, however, persisted in the minority view that the ultra
vires defense was available except in the special case of a fully performed contract. See generally
Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisions (pts. I & II), 42 W.

VA. L.Q. 179, 187-89 (1936) (discussing the Supreme Court's transition from a strict to liberal view
of ultra vires transactions).

53. See Lincoin Court Realty Co. v. Kentucky Title Say. Bank & Trust Co., 169 Ky. 840, 185
S.W. 156 (1916); Martin v. Niagara Falls Paper Mfg. Co., 122 N.Y. 165, 25 N.E. 303 (1890); Perkins
v. Trinity Realty Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 723, 61 A. 167 (1905).
54. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 186-87.
55. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587-88 (1839).
56. Id. at 588.
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eral cases decided in l910.57 Like the decline of ultra vires, this legal
development reflected the view that corporations were creations of private initiative, rather than artificial products of state action.
Simultaneously, the phenomenal growth in the size of corporations
prompted new ideas about the inevitability of economic concentration. 58
These ideas offered support for the view that successful corporations are
the product of a combination of entrepreneurial initiative and the natural, impersonal forces of market competition. The older idea that states
were responsible for the creation of corporate power no longer seemed
appropriate. Given competition's apparently decisive role in determining
market structures, efforts to regulate the balance of economic power
through corporate law appeared unnecessary and, in any event, likely to
prove futile.
As a natural entity constituted by private individuals and inevitable
market forces, the corporation appeared less deserving of the special attention accorded to it under state corporate law's traditional regulatory
assumptions. The triumph of the new theory therefore signaled a willingness to dispense with the use of corporate law as a regulatory tool
designed to address the special social and economic problems that Americans saw as stemming from the rise of the business corporation. Theory
instead tended to assimilate corporate persons to the status of natural
persons, eliminating the many special limitations on corporate freedom
of action that the states had imposed in the past. With this change in
theory came a new willingness to treat corporate activity as fundamentally private in nature, differing in no important ways from ordinary individual commercial activities and therefore free from special legal
regulations designed to protect public welfare. Corporate law thus lost
much of its public character and instead took on a private law aspect as
its focus turned from external concerns to the internal problem of corporate governance.
As thinking shifted from an artificial to a natural explanation for the
basis for corporate existence and thus from a regulatory to a private law
perspective, these developments encouraged defenders of shareholder
economic interests and opponents of regulation to reconceptualize the
corporation in aggregate or "partnership" terms rather than as an entity. 59 The point of these efforts was to emphasize that corporate prop57. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 416-17 (1910); Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
216 U.S. 146, 164 (1910); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 18 (1910); Pullman Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 (1910).
58. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 190-97; Millon, supra note 24, at 1271-75.
59. See 1 V. MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER
THAN CHARITABLE 1-2,24 (1882); H. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OP PRIVATE CORPORA-
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erty rights are nothing more than individual property rights and
therefore entitled to the same protections. One treatise writer argued
that "[b]y dismissing this fiction [of the 'legal person'] a clearer view may
be had of the actual human beings interested, whose rights may then be
determined without unnecessary mystification." 60 In other words, the
fact that private individuals had chosen to do business as a corporation
should not be a basis for subjecting their financial interests to regulation
that otherwise would not apply. This notion of the nature of the corporation and of shareholder property rights lay behind Justice Field's opinion in the Railroad Tax Cases in which the circuit court held that the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause applied to corporations:
To deprive the corporation of its property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to
deprive the corporators of their property or to lessen its value....
[Tlhe courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the corporation to the persons who compose it, and protect them, though the
61
process be in its name.
The same theory of the corporation led the Supreme Court to conclude
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protected cor62
porate, as well as natural, persons.
Despite this emerging reliance on an aggregate theory, an entity
theory of the corporation still dominated during the early decades of this
century. Rejection of the aggregate theory, however, was not due to rejection of its private property rights foundation. Instead, developments
in the internal relationship between management and shareholders rendered the partnership analogy untenable. Growth in the size of corporations and dispersal of share ownership resulted in the phenomenon later
described as the separation of ownership and control in Adolf Berle and
Gardner Means' famous book, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property.63 One of the most salient features of this development was the
prevention of active participation by shareholders in the management of
the business. As a practical matter, dispersed share ownership, small
individual holdings, and increasingly complex operations transformed
iv (1884); see also 1 C. BEACH, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO1-4 (1891).
60. H. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at iv; see also V. MORAWETZ, supra note 59, at 2 ("[Tlhe rights
and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons who
compose it, and not of an imaginary being.").
61. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747-48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal dismissed as moot
sub nom. San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
62. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). For discussion of the
theory of the corporation underlying this decision, see Horwitz, supra note 5, at 176-79; Mark, supra
note 15, at 1463-64.
63. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 34, at 119-25.
TIONS HAVING CAPITAL STOCK at
RATIONS
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shareholders from entrepreneurs into passive investors who placed their
economic interests in the hands of professional managers.
One doctrinal area that reflected these changes was the law governing shareholder voting rights. Although a unanimity requirement traditionally had protected the shareholders' right to veto important
questions of corporate policy (a right analogous to that enjoyed by a
member of a partnership), during the early years of the 20th century
state courts gradually abandoned the unanimity requirement for de facto
consolidations that were achieved through sales of assets in exchange for
stock in an acquiring firm intending to continue operations of the selling
corporation. 64 At the same time, state legislatures began to condition
outright mergers and other fundamental corporate changes merely on
majority shareholder approval, subject to appraisal rights for dissenters. 65 Majoritarianism could not be squared with an individualist, property rights conception of share ownership. If a mere majority could bind
a dissenting minority, "the corporate will" had to mean something other
than the actual consent of the incorporators.
Also indicating rejection of an aggregate theory was a reconceptualization of the source of management's power Traditional principles
vested ultimate managerial power in the shareholders, with directors enjoying only such responsibility as actually was delegated. 66 During the
early 20th century, legal doctrine instead came to locate managerial
power in the directors as a matter of law, regardless of any express delegation. Thus, for example, one court described the board's power as
"original and undelegated" and therefore not subject to the common law
prohibition against an agent's power to appoint a subagent. 67 Furthermore, the directors' powers were seen to be coextensive with those of the
corporation itself. In the words of an important theorist, "where the
whole sum of corporate powers is vested by law in a board of directors[,]
...such an organization... allows us to see in a large railroad, banking
or insurance corporation rather an aggregation of capital than an association of persons." 65 In other words, the shareholders' legal status as passive investors in a corporation controlled by an omnipotent and distant
64. See Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 596 (1921); Metcalf v. American School Furniture Co., 122 F. 115, 119 (W.D.N.Y. 1903); Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co.,
10 Del. Ch. 371, 378, 93 A. 380, 383 (1915). Previously, a majority could bind dissenting shareholders to an asset sale only in cases in which the corporation was insolvent and the consideration was
cash. See Geddes, 254 U.S. at 596.
65. By 1927, at least 20 states had adopted such statutes. Weiner, Payment ofDissentingStockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 548 n.7 (1927).
66. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chicago Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 596 (1896); Cass v. Manchester
Iron & Steel Co., 9 F. 640, 642 (W.D. Pa. 1881).
67. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918).
68. E. FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CoRPoRATIoNs 58 (1897).
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board made it very difficult to think about the corporation as analogous
to a general partnership, in which the right of control was vested in the
partners.
Thus, during the early decades of the 20th century, changes in legal
doctrine and business practice encouraged rejection of efforts to describe
the corporation as an aggregation. Instead, theory reaffirmed the traditional idea of the corporation as an entity existing separately from its
ownership. What was different, however, was the explanation for the
source of corporate power. Whereas older thinking had conceived of the
corporation as an artificial creature of the state, the natural entity theory
emphasized the initiative of the incorporators rather than state action as
the key constitutive factor. Furthermore, market forces determined the
success or failure of particular firms, and economic concentration now
appeared to be inevitable. The existence as well as the size of business
corporations were considered natural phenomena. As such, there no
longer appeared to be any justification for legal regulation peculiar to
corporate (as opposed to individual) activity, and the state's traditional
regulatory responsibility was deemphasized.
2. The Entity Theory and Corporate Citizenship. In the wake of
the Depression, critics of big business' apparent disregard for public welfare argued in favor of what has come to be called "corporate social responsibility." While the natural entity theory was being used to free the
corporation from state-imposed restrictions on its ability to accumulate
wealth and was also interpreted to imply that corporate persons owed no
obligations or responsibilities different from those owed by natural persons, E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., in a famous law review article published in
1932, demonstrated how the natural entity idea could provide a theoreti69
cal basis for corporate social responsibility.
The problem facing Dodd was how to justify corporate policies that
sought to benefit constituencies other than shareholders in situations in
which the result would be a diminution of profits. Such constituencies
might include employees of the corporation, consumers of its products,
creditors, or communities in which the corporation's plants were located.
Adoption of policies responsive to any of these interests might cost the
shareholders money either in the short or long run. Dodd claimed to
recognize a trend among corporate managers in favor of such activities.
He cited the views of Owen D. Young, an officer of General Electric Co.,
who argued that the corporation should recognize "its public obligations
69. Dodd, For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. Rnv. 1145 (1932).
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and perform its public duties- in a word, vast as it is, that it should be a
'70
good citizen."
Applied to natural persons, the concept of citizenship refers to the
individual's commitment to other-regarding goals that are valued without respect to self-interest or personal financial welfare. Corporate citizens likewise might disregard purely economic self-interest in
circumstances in which social obligation dictates that they do so. 7 1 From
the shareholders' perspective, the citizenship idea demands a justification
for corporate activity not 'devoted to the narrow objective of wealth maximization. How can management justify policies that benefit workers,
consumers, or others at the expense of those who have contributed the
corporation's capital?
Dodd's article presented a solution that depended on an entity
theory of the corporation. If management's role was to act solely as
agent of the shareholders, failure to promote shareholder interests over
other competing interests would violate management's fiduciary responsibility. If, however, management were the agent of a corporate entity
distinct from the shareholder aggregation and that entity were obliged to
be a "good citizen," then management, acting for the corporation, would
enjoy the power to discharge the corporation's citizenship responsibilities, even in situations in which the shareholders might object. 72 Dodd
70. Id at 1154. Dodd's quotation of Young is worth reproducing in full as a powerful statement in favor of corporate social responsibility.
[There are three groups of people who have an interest in that institution. One is the
group of fifty-odd thousand people who have put their capital in the company, namely, its
stockholders. Another is a group of well toward one hundred thousand people who are
putting their labor and their lives into the business of the company. The third group is of
customers and the general public.
Customers have a right to demand that a concern so large shall not only do its business honestly and properly, but, further, that it shall meet its public obligations and perform its public duties-in a word, vast as it is, that it should be a good citizen.
Now, I conceive my trust first to be to see to it that the capital which is put into this
concern is safe, honestly and wisely used, and paid a fair rate of return. Otherwise we
cannot get capital. The worker will have no tools.
Second, that the people who put their labor and lives into this concern get fair wages,
continuity of employment, and a recognition of their right to their jobs where they have
educated themselves to highly skilled and specialized work.
Third, that the customers get a product which is as represented and that the price is
such as is consistent with the obligations to the people who put their capital and labor in.
Last, that the public has a concern functioning in the public interest and performing
its duties as a great and good citizen should.
Id
71. For a more recent statement of this idea, see White, How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416 (1985).
72. If courts recognize corporate social responsibility, shareholders no longer could attack "altruistic" behavior on the ground of breach of trust. As Dodd argues:
That the duty of the managers is to employ the funds of the corporate institution which
they manage solely for the purposes of their institution is indisputable. That that purpose,
both factually and legally, is maximum stockholder profit has commonly been assumed by
lawyers. That such is factually the purpose of the stockholders in creating the association
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thus concluded that management was trustee for the corporation, not for
73
its shareholders.
Dodd's argument depended expressly on a novel interpretation of
the entity theory. He seized upon that theory's core idea, the corporation
as a distinct entity separate from its constituent elements. This distinction-between the corporation and its shareholders-made possible the
further distinction between the interests of the corporation and the interests of its shareholders. Because management worked for the corporation, its obligations to the shareholders were, at best, secondary and
indirect. As a result, shareholders lacked the ability to insist on pure
wealth maximization based solely on the trusteeship principle. The
theory thus denied the relevance of the shareholders' objection to corporate citizenship since management was not spending their money. As
articulated by Dodd, the natural entity theory threatened the legitimacy
of single-minded accumulation and the primacy of shareholder financial
interests.
The demise of the ultra vires doctrine and other limitations on what
corporations could do made Dodd's interpretation of the natural entity
theory particularly apt. As we have seen, one aspect of the reconceptualization of the corporation as a natural entity was an expanded view of
the nature of corporate powers. 74 The practical effects of this development included removal of a traditional doctrinal obstacle to socially responsible corporate conduct. Although the ultra vires doctrine originally
had served to protect the public's interest in preventing corporate usurpations of powers not specifically delegated, the doctrine also had come
to protect shareholders from uses of corporate resources that were unexpected and therefore unauthorized. Older cases had relied on the ultra
vires doctrine to invalidate corporate charitable activities on the ground
that they exceeded the firm's lawful powers. 75 However, an expanded
may be granted. Nevertheless, the association, once it becomes a going concern, takes its

place in a business world with certain ethical standards which appear to be developing in
the direction of increased social responsibility. If we think of it as an institution which
differs in the nature of things from the individuals who compose it, we may then readily
conceive of it as person, which, like other persons engaged in business, is affected not only
by the laws which regulate business but by the attitude of the public and business opinion
as to the social obligations of business. If business is tending to become a profession, then a
corporate person engaged in business is a professional even though its stockholders, who
take no active part in the conduct of the business, may not be. Those through whom it acts
may therefore employ its funds in a manner appropriate to a person practising a profession
and imbued with a sense of social responsibility without thereby being guilty of a breach of
trust.
Dodd, supra note 69, at 1161.
73. Compare Adolf Berle's quite different use of the trustee idea. See infra text accompanying
notes 85-87.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
75. See, eg., Brinson Ry. v. Exchange Bank, 16 Ga. App. 425, 425, 85 S.E. 634, 635 (1915)
(beyond the power of president of railway company to donate funds belonging to the corporation);
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notion of implied powers resulted in virtual destruction of the doctrine as
a basis for challenge to management activities not strictly authorized by
76
the corporate charter.

Changes in the manner in which corporations were constituted also
had the effect of diminishing the efficacy of express charter provisions
concerning corporate powers as a significant check on management discretion. General incorporation statutes invited incorporators to create
firms possessing any powers they deemed necessary to accomplish their
purposes. With few exceptions, corporate power was limited only to the
extent that the persons forming the corporation found limitation to be
desirable. The growing tendency was to describe powers broadly to preclude any possible ultra vires challenge to corporate activity. In the
words of one commentator, charter provisions defining corporate
objectives
are often made so multifarious that it has been said that the aim seems
to be "not to specify, not to disclose, but to bury beneath a mass of
words the real object or objects of the company with the intent that
every conceivable' 7form of activity shall be found included somewhere
within its terms." 7

By 1935, a lawyer could state that a typical charter provision included no
78
limitations at all.

McCrory v. Chambers, 48 IM.App. 445, 453 (1892) (directors of national bank cannot use the position or the money of the bank for charity); Orpheum Theater & Realty Co. v. Seavey & Flarsheim
Brokerage Co., 197 Mo. App. 661, 671, 199 S.W. 257, 260 (1917) (brokerage company's charitable
subscription for erection of theatre was ultra vires since state law limited company's activities to the
"brokerage business").
76. See, eg., Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58, 59 (W.D.N.Y. 1922)
(subscription by business corporation to educational institution allowed when there was reasonable
probability of benefit to the corporation); People v. Hotchkiss, 136 A.D. 150, 154, 120 N.Y.S. 649,
651-52 (1909) (life insurance company allowed to purchase lands on which to erect hospital for the
care and treatment of its employees afflicted with tuberculosis); Virgil v. Virgil Practice Clavier Co.,
33 Misc. 200, 201, 68 N.Y.S. 335, 336 (1900) (corporation under charter to manufacture musical
instruments allowed to set up school); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 47, 40 N.Y.S. 718,
720 (1895) ("If that act is one which is lawful in itself, and not otherwise prohibited, is done for the
purpose of serving corporate ends, in a substantial, and not in a remote fanciful sense, it may fairly
be considered within charter powers.").
77. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 33, at 194-95.
78. The modem statutes ... in describing the purposes for which corporations may be
formed, use such general phrases as "for any lawful business purpose or purposes" or "to
promote or conduct any legitimate objects or purposes." By these statutes, persons forming a corporation are in effect invited to adopt for the corporation an unlimited range of
permissible business activity. It has become customary, in drafting certificates of incorporation under such statutes, to provide in broad terms power to conduct almost any and
every conceivable kind of business, as for instance: "to buy, sell, lease, mortgage, hold,
trade and deal generally in any and every kind of property, real and personal, tangible and
intangible" or even broader: "to do any and all acts, exercise any and all powers which a
natural person may do or exercise, except such as are prohibited by law to corporations."
W. GRANGE, CORPORATION LAW FOR OPPCERS AND DIRECTORS 44-45 (1935) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting New York and Delaware statutes from the 1930s).
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Critics like Dodd and General Electric's Young argued that the corporate person, which had the legal ability to act in unselfish ways, actually had an affirmative duty to do so. The basis for this claim was the
fact of the large corporation's enormous economic and political power.
With this power came the obligation to use it in a socially responsible
manner. The objective was a legal regime that encouraged managers to
use their broad powers not only for the benefit of shareholders, employees, and other participants in the corporation's activities but also for the
good of the general public. This view of corporate activity and corporate
law thus directly challenged recently elaborated theories of the corporation's freedom from public accountability and its responsibility to the
shareholders alone. Here then was an argument for a public law of
corporations.
Thus, just as the natural entity theory had gained prominence, it
was interpreted in ways that posed a challenge to a purely private conception of corporate law centering on shareholder financial interests.
Doctrines that had freed management to exercise discretion without accountability to shareholders now threatened to provide legal justification
for corporate "citizenship." Far from assuring the triumph of big business, the natural entity theory itself contained implications that critics
relied on to attack the large corporation's new-found position of privileged economic power. The contest over corporate citizenship was an
episode in the ongoing debate over whether corporate activity, and therefore corporate law, is public or private. The natural entity theory had
the potential to aid either side in this battle. Those who sought to buttress the corporation's freedom from a legal regime responsive to public
interest concerns turned instead to an entirely different theory of the
corporation.
C. The Aggregate Theory and the Privatization of CorporateLaw
1. ShareholderPrimacy. The most visible opponents of Dodd's
corporate citizenship claims were Berle and Means. In The Modern Corporation and Private Property published in 1932, 79 Berle and Means
demonstrated in great detail how "the separation of ownership and control" was increasingly characteristic of the large, powerful business corporations in which the broad dispersion of share ownership necessitated
delegation of responsibility for control to a small group of professional
managers. This separation brought with it an apparently inevitable divergence of interest, with shareholders seeking corporate profit max79. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 34.
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imization for their own benefit and managers seeking to entrench
themselves in order to use their powers to further their own interests:
[I]t is therefore evident that we are dealing not only with distinct but
often opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on the
other-a control which tends to move further and further away from
ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself,
a management capable of perpetuating its own position. The concentration of economic power separate from ownership has, in fact, created economic empires, and has delivered these empires into the hands
of a new form of absolutism, relegating "owners" to the position of
those who supply the means whereby the new princes may exercise
their power.80
Besides the corporate citizenship argument sketched above, developments like the gradual abandonment of older legal controls on corporate
management,8 1 the absence of protections from dilution of stock holdings, 82 and management's broad discretion over whether to distribute
earnings to shareholders8 3 all lent a sense of urgency to Berle and
Means's analysis. In light of these developments'and the prevalence of
the corporate form in the business world, what was at stake in their eyes
was the institution of private property itself: "It requires little analysis
to make plain the fact that private property, as understood in the capitalist system, is rapidly losing its original characteristics. Unless the law
stops the wide open gap which the corporate mechanism has introduced,
the entire system has to be revalued."' 84 Berle and Means thus pointedly
raised the accountability problem that has been corporate law's central
concern ever since: How could shareholders---the corporation's "owners"-have any assurance that management would act to maximize
shareholders' financial interests?
Berle and Means' solution was to view management's role as that of
trustee for the shareholders. The legitimacy of management's exercise of
power of control turned on whether "under all the circumstances the
result fairly protects the interests of the shareholders. 8 5 Corporate statutes defined management's powers so broadly and so vaguely that courts
80. Id. at 124.
81. See id. at 127-52.
82. Id. at 153-88.
83. Id. at 189-206.
84. Id. at 247.
85. Id. at 275. See generally id at 247-76 (corporations' powers to issue stock, to declare or
withhold dividends, to acquire stock in other corporations, to amend its charter, and to transfer the
corporate enterprise are limited in that they can be exercised only so long as the interests of the
shareholder are protected); Berle, CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049
(1931). Berle and Means claimed that the trustee principle could be found in the case law, see A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 34, at 276, but this has been challenged. See Weiner, The BerleDodd Dialogueon the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1458 (1964).
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necessarily had been called on to define their limits. Like any other
trustee, the corporate manager's powers therefore were subject to substantive equitable limitations. 86 For Berle and Means, use of the trust
and property analogy led necessarily to the conclusion that the trustee
must act for the benefit of the equitable owner or cestui que trust-the
87
shareholder.
This view of the shareholders' legal entitlement thus rejected any
argument to the effect that management ought be able to spend corporate
assets or engage in other activities not financially beneficial to shareholders. In a short article published in 1932, Berle responded to Dodd by
arguing that corporate management should devote its attention solely to
shareholder wealth maximization. 88 Yet Berle and Means were not implacably hostile to the sort of corporate social responsibility that Dodd
and others were advocating. They acknowledged that a different legal
regime might mandate that "the corporate profit 'stream in reality no
longer is [the shareholders'] private property, and that claims on it must
be adjusted by some test other than that of property right." 89 Nevertheless, the thrust of their work was in another direction. Anything besides
a legal principle requiring strict attention to shareholder financial interests was suspect because it would be too amorphous; the gains to society
would be speculative, but the losses to shareholders certain. 90 In any
event, the immediate challenge was to design a corporate governance
scheme that would subject management's stewardship of other peoples'
property to some kind of meaningful constraint. The problem of managerial discretion and accountability to shareholders thus emerged as the
central problem of corporate law, a position it has occupied ever since.
By analyzing the corporation from the perspective of the shareholders' "private property" rights, Berle and Means insisted on the preeminence of the shareholder financial interests as the appropriate object of
legal attention. Berle and Means effectively disregarded notions of the
corporate entity and peered directly into the corporate enterprise, focusing their attention on those they considered to be the relevant actorsshareholders and the professional managers to whom they had entrusted
their property. The theory of the corporation implicit in their work is of
an aggregation composed of shareholders and management, the latter
86. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 34,at 275.
87. Id.
88. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees. A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365
(1932).

89. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 34, at 247. Under such a regime, shareholders would in
effect consent to corporate social responsibility by surrendering control over their property to management. See id at 354-56.
90. See id at 355 (referring to "the relative certainty and safety of a trust relationship").
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confined to labor for the interests of shareholders by standard principles
of property and trust law.
Berle and Means's shareholder primacy position, and the aggregate
assumptions on which it was based, were not entirely novel. The classic
statement could be found already in Dodge v. FordMotor Co. ,91 decided
in 1919. The Dodge brothers were minority shareholders of Ford Motor
Co., which had accumulated an enormous surplus through highly profitable operations. The Dodges claimed that Henry Ford had resisted distribution of the surplus because he planned to expand production in
order "to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial
system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives
and their homes."' 92 Ford sought to use retained earnings rather than
future revenue to finance expansion because he also intended to benefit
consumers by lowering the prices of the company's automobiles.
The Dodges did not structure their challenge in terms of ultra vires.
Ford's policies seemed consistent with the corporation's objective as
stated in the charter, which included the "purchase, manufacture and
placing on the market for sale of automobiles. ' 93 If Ford's intention to
benefit employees and consumers violated the Dodges' rights as shareholders, some other legal principle would have to provide the basis for
relief. The Michigan Supreme Court's response emphasized that the
management's first responsibility was to the shareholders:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the
choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in
the end itself, to reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of prof94
its among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
The court cited no precedent for this statement, which has become the
classic formulation of the principle that management must conduct corporate affairs for the benefit of the shareholders rather than for some
other constituency.
The shareholder primacy conception of corporate purpose rejected
any notion of management's power to engage in socially responsive activities. Instead, as Berle and Means argued, management's responsibility
was to the shareholders. As trustees, managers must act only in a way
that furthered shareholder financial interests, because to countenance
anything else would be to allow conduct no different from outright embezzlement of shareholder property by the trustee. Corporate activity
91. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
92. Id. at 468, 170 N.W. at 671.

93. Id. at 463, 170 N.W. at 669.
94. Id at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
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was nothing more than the pursuit of business objectives by individual
property owners acting through fiduciaries. Corporate law might legitimately regulate the shareholder-manager relationship because of the inherent accountability problems that trust relationships present. But the
shareholder primacy position implicitly rejected the notion that there
was a public welfare dimension to corporate activity; it therefore also
rejected any justification for legal regulation based on the idea that activities of large corporations affect in important ways a broad range of constituencies other than shareholders. In this manner, shareholder primacy
implied a private conception of corporate law.
The theoretical foundation of this shareholder-centered, privatized
conception of corporate law included a complete disregard for the entitybased idea on which Dodd built his corporate citizenship argument. The
shareholder primacy conception reduced the corporation to the purely
private financial interests of its owners, the"shareholders. Dodd's competing solicitude for such non-shareholder constituencies as employees
and consumers was rejected by this new conception as illegitimate, just as
Ford's had been. 95 Since then, the shareholder primacy principle has
been the fundamental postulate of corporate law96 and is the standard
response to arguments in favor of corporate social responsibility. Accordingly, corporations seeking to act in a manner apparently contrary to
the financial interests of the shareholders must make one of two available
arguments. They either must identify express authorization by statute or
corporate charter,97 or argue that in fact shareholders will benefit (even

if only in the long run) from the conduct in question. 98
The natural entity theory of the corporation appeared simultaneously to bolster claims for the privatization of corporate law and to encourage doctrinal tendencies that might have allowed corporate
management to adopt socially responsible policies. The now orthodox
restriction of corporations to shareholder wealth maximization does not
95. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
96. In the words of Kenneth B. Davis, "The bedrock principle of U.S. corporate law remains

that maximization of shareholder value is the polestar for managerial decisionmaking." Davis, Dircretion of CorporateManagement to Do Good at the Expense ofShareholderGain-A Survey of, and
Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 8 (1988).

97. The only significant example of such statutory authorization is the provision included in
most state corporation statutes that allows corporations to make charitable contributions reasonable
in amount. See, ag., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1988).
98. See, e.g., Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878, 879 (Del. 1970) (payment to directors justified in
order to prevent company from folding); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 181, 237 N.E.2d
776, 780 (1968) (refusal to install lights at Wrigley Field justified by reference to preservation of
neighborhood in order to encourage attendance and protect property values); Union Pacific R.R. v.

Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 103, 329 P.2d 398, 399 (1958) (contribution to charity justified as
source of good will).
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rest on an interpretation of the entity theory. Instead, it arose from a
different theory of the corporation, one that rested on an aggregate
approach. It is not that an aggregate theory was somehow logically necessary if corporations were to overcome arguments in favor of social responsibility. Those arguing for shareholder primacy might have
modified an entity theory to accommodate protections for shareholders
opposed to corporate acts of social responsibility. For example, such
proponents might have drawn a distinction between corporate persons
and natural persons to determine whether charitable activities are permissible. Instead, however, legal thinkers made a different argument, in
effect ignoring the entity characteristics of the corporation with respect
to this question, and substituting and then elaborating upon the meaning
of a different theory.
2. The Irrelevance of Social Responsibility Claims. From the triumph of the aggregate theory of the corporation soon after 1930 until
very recently, the most important issue in corporate law has been the
accountability question. So-called managerialists defend management's
broad discretion in the supervision of the corporation's business. 9 9 Antimanagerialists complain that management is insufficiently accountable. 100 And legal doctrines vacillate between the poles of generous managerial discretion and .strict accountability. 10 ' In all these debates,
however, the fundamental norm-shareholder primacy-has remained
firm and immune from challenge.
One consequence of the dominance of this aggregate, privatized approach to corporate law has been the irrelevance of recurrent arguments
that corporations ought to act in a "socially responsible" manner. The
key idea behind these criticisms has been the notion that those who manage corporations, as stewards of great concentrations of economic power,
should be made (or at least allowed) to consider the social and economic
effects of their business policies, even if the result is detrimental to share99. See J. HuRsT, supra note 15, at 105-07 (discussing expertise as source of corporate management's legitimacy); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracyin American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276,
1318-34 (1984) (same):
100. The classic article in this genre is Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
101. The business judgment rule restricts the danger that directors will be held personally liable

in connection with their work as directors. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
As such, this doctrine reflects the impulse to give management generous latitude in its conduct of the
corporation's business. Nevertheless, occasional judicial decisions have resulted in personal liability,
reflecting the contrary impulse toward accountability to shareholders. See Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding directors personally liable for "gross negligence" in approving a
merger). Critics of that decision stressed its perceived departure from a tradition ofjudicial leniency
in evaluation of management decisionmaking.
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holder financial interests. Proponents of such claims, which resurfaced
during the late 1950s and 1960s, argued that exercise of economic power
by large corporations has significant public ramifications. As one commentator noted: "The corporate organizations of business have long
ceased to be private phenomena. That they have a direct impact on the
social, economic, and political life of the nation is no longer a matter of
argument."10 2 Abram Chayes went even further, assigning responsibility
to big business for a whole range of modem society's ills:
[Corporations] bear a large responsibility for the quality and tone of
American life. The neglect of basic research, the dilution of the college
degree, the organization man, the dullness and superficiality of the
mass media, the level of political morality-all these offspring, wanted
or unwanted, find their way in the end to the doorstep of the modem
corporation. 103
According to Chayes, these pervasive social effects justified a legal
regime dedicated to the public interest, a socially responsive corporate
law. For example, he argued that those affected by corporate activity
ought to have a legal right to participate in corporate decisionmaking.
He saw clearly that arguments about how the law should treat corporations typically depend on underlying theories about what corporations
are. Criticizing the conventional notion of the corporation as its shareholders, he wrote:
A concept of the corporation which draws the boundary of "membership" thus narrowly is seriously inadequate.... The error has more
than theoretical importance because the line between those who are
"inside" and those who are "outside" the corporation is the line between those whom we recognize as entitled to1a regularized share in its
processes of decision and those who are not. 04
Although Chayes spoke mostly of participation in governance by employees, it was only by way of example:
A more spacious conception of [corporate] "membership," and one
closer to the facts of corporate life, would include all those having a
relation of sufficient intimacy with the corporation or subject to its
power in a sufficiently specialized way. Their rightful share in decisions on the exercise of corporate power would be exercised through an
institutional arrangement appropriately designed to represent the interests of a constituency of members having a significant common relation to the corporation and its power.10-5
102. Friedmann, CorporatePower, Governance by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L.
REv. 155, 176 (1957).
103. Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule ofLaw, in THE CORPORATION AND MODERN SociETY 25, 26-27 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
104. Id. at 41.
105. Id.
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Chayes' response to social responsibility concerns depended on legal
reforms that would give those affected by corporate activity a direct say
in corporate governance. The theory of the corporation on which this
argument was based was an aggregate theory-Chayes talked about corporations not in terms of who owned them but rather in terms of those
who might claim "membership"' 10 6 by virtue of their susceptibility to exercises of corporate power. He did not deny that the corporate aggregation, broad as it potentially might be, was bounded, although he seemed
to be aware that, under his approach, the boundary between the corporation and the rest of society might be vague. 10 7 Thus, corporate law, as a
body of law regulating internal relations among "members" of the firm,
might still retain its private character, but its reach would be much
broader than under the conventional shareholder-centered conception.10 8
Milton Friedman's defense of unalloyed corporate profit maximization, published in the New York Times Magazine, exemplified conventional thinking about the flawed logic of corporate social responsibility
arguments. 0 9 Friedman's central idea was the notion of the shareholders as property owners and managers as the shareholders' agents-another version of the familiar aggregate conception of the corporation. To
say that corporate philanthropy was the act of the corporate entity, distinct from its shareholders, was nonsense because the entity was merely a
legal fiction. Instead, it was necessary to determine who was spending
whose money. If managers wished to devote their own time or wealth to
charitable pursuits they were of course free to do so, but to use their
corporate control powers for such objectives was to spend other peoples'
money without consent. Not only was socially responsible corporate activity an illegitimate use of shareholder property; managers who acted in
this way in effect were imposing a tax on shareholders and deciding to
what worthy purposes the proceeds should be put. For Friedman, such a
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Not all corporate social responsibility proponents have used arguments about corporate

theory to support their positions. An alternative was simply to claim that corporate activity should
be subjected to some sort of public interest regulation-because of its broad social impact, without

paying any explicit attention to theories about what corporations are. This was the approach taken
by Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman, who argued that because "[o]ur largest corporations ...exercise vast power--over workers, shareholders, customers, and other citizens," corporate
law ought to be revised in ways that render that power accountable and subject to meaningful control on behalf of the public interest. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 62 (1976). Rather than engaging in argumentation over theories of the corporation,
the authors devoted their attention to the need for a federal corporate chartering system.
109. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept.
13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33 [hereinafter Friedman, SocialResponsibility]; see also M. FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (1962).
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confusion of public and private function could not be justified. The manager,. in effect,
becomes... a public employee, a civil servant, even though he remains
in name an employee of a private enterprise.... If [he is] to impose
taxes and make expenditures to foster "social" objectives, then political machinery must be set up to guide the assessment of taxes and to
determine through a political process the objectives to be served. 110
In Friedman's eyes, a conception of corporate law that tolerated formulation of public policy by corporate managers was obviously illegitimate
because their function, like that of corporations, was purely private.
Attractive as corporate social responsibility claims might be to
many people, the calls for reform have had no discernible impact on corporate law. Conventional belief in the shareholder-centered, private law
character of corporate law has been sufficiently powerful to render such
claims hopelessly marginal. The focus on shareholders and managers
within the aggregation excludes from consideration other potential
claimants to legal recognition. It is as though the social responsibility
proponents speak a foreign language. Given the strength of dominant
thinking about corporate activity and corporate law, they might as plausibly advocate public ownership.
In light of conventional ideas of what corporations are and the appropriate content of corporate law, only criticism centered on the internal relationship between shareholders and management has had a hope
of being taken seriously. For example, advocates of "corporate democracy" have argued that management ought to be accountable to shareholders in ways analogous to the relationship between citizens and
governmental officials.'11 This accountability problem, rather than the
social responsibility claims discussed above, has been the principle
source of legitimacy concerns since the 1930s. Thus, Gerald Frug's detailed study of the various efforts undertaken to legitimate bureaucratic
corporate organization focuses on various efforts to justify the internal
distribution of power.'1 2 Under reigning assumptions about corporate
activity and the appropriate functions of corporate law, the problem of
the external relation between corporation and society has not generated
analogous legitimacy concerns. Berle's vision of the corporation as
shareholder-owners and management-fiduciary has provided the basic
110. Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 109, at 122. To these arguments, Friedman
added the familiar assertion that because of the pitfalls involved in any individual attempting to
define the public interest, corporate managers are far more likely to contribute to general welfare
through diligent pursuit of private advantage. It is only out of such pursuits that "social values" can
emerge. Id. at 126.
111. See, eg., Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SociETY 218 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
112. See Frug, supra note 99.
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model for thinking about corporations and therefore has effectively defined the boundaries within which serious debate about corporate law

can take place.
3. The New Economic Theory of the Corporation. Since around
1980, legal academics have developed a new theory of the corporation
explicitly grounded on neoclassical economics. This theory conceives of
the corporation as a "nexus of contracts." 113 The legal theory's reliance
on economic analysis and vocabulary are novel developments, but the
theory's aggregate, shareholder-centered foundation is not. Its roots can
be traced to Ronald Coase's 1937 article, in which he attempted to ex-

plain the corporation's reliance on intra-firm transactions rather than
market transactions according to transaction cost savings."14 Coase's
analysis of the corporation, which focused on the relevant actors rather

than on reified notions of the corporate entity, paralleled the changes in
legal theory traced above. 1 5 The new theorists differ with Coase in important respects, some even rejecting his fundamental distinction be-

tween intra-firm and market transactions. The new theorists also reject
the utility of the conception of shareholders as "owners" of the corporation, preferring instead to describe shareholders as only one among the
various suppliers of "inputs," whose rights are determined by the interre-

lation of the various contracts that define and constitute the corporate
enterprise. 16 Nevertheless, by depicting the corporation as nothing but
the sum of the agreements among individual suppliers of various inputs,
the new economic theory is a further application of Coase's and conventional legal theorists' aggregate approach to corporate theory.
113. The seminal works are Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972), and Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 3. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Other important
contributions include Cheung, The ContractualNature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1983), and
Fama & Jensen, The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). For a
recent survey, see Butler, The ContractualTheory of the Corporation, 11 GEo. MASON L. REV. 99
(1989). For examples of the new economic theory in the legal literature, see Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982); Hessen, A New Concept of Corporatiors" A
Contractualand PrivatePropertyModel, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979); Kraakman, CorporateLia-

bility Strategiesand the Costs ofLegal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 49 (1984); Scott, CorporationLaw and
the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv. 927 (1983). Critical
appraisals of the theory from legal scholars include Bratton, CriticalAppraisal, supra note 15; Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403
(1985); Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985). For an historical overview, see Bratton,

New Economic Theory, supra note 15.
114. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).

115. See supra Part II.C.
116. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 113, at 778, 791-93.
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The new economic theory asserts that the relations among managers, shareholders, and the other participants in the firm "do not differ in
the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two
people." 117 As a legal tool for organization of production, the corporation has no "power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action ... ."118
Management's role is simply to oversee the ongoing process of voluntary
negotiation, agreement, and adjustment among the various actors who
participate in the firm's activities.119 In this capacity, managers act as
agents for the shareholder principals.1 20 Forced by practical necessity to
rely on agents, shareholders face the ever-present risk that managers will
fail to act in ways that maximize shareholder financial interests. The
costs associated with this risk are called "agency costs." In contrast to
creditors and others with fixed claims against corporate revenue, it is the
shareholders as residual claimants who ultimately bear these agency
costs. If the web of contracts that makes up the firm fails to minimize
agency costs, shareholders pay these costs because buyers will pay less
for their stock and distributions or liquidation proceeds will be lower
than they would have been under more efficient management.
Market forces-including pressures from capital, management, labor, product, service, and corporate control markets-create the incentives for managers to organize and oversee production in a manner
optimally beneficial to shareholders-in other words, incentives to minimize agency costs. Legal rules may supplement these incentives, but
market forces by themselves encourage optimal contracting strategies.
To the extent there is any role for legal rules in this framework, the need
is for rules that provide mandatory contract terms designed to lessen
agency costs by discouraging mismanagement. Rules that fail to protect
shareholders from agency costs serve no legitimate function because reduction of agency costs is the only justification for corporate law.
It turns out that market forces also will determine the content of
legal rules: Less than optimal rules of corporate law will not survive
because shareholders will not tolerate them. Instead, according to the
new economic theory, they will cause the corporation to reincorporate in
another state that does not have those rules. The competition among
117. Id. at 772.
118. Id.at 777.
119. Bratton distinguishes a weaker "institutionalist" variation from the "neoclassical" theory
described here. See Bratton, CriticalAppraisal,supra note 15, at 411-16. According to the institutionalist approach, the firm's participants create a hierarchical governance structure as an alternative
to the pure market contracting characteristic of the neoclassical picture. See 0. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING

(1985).
120. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 113, at 309.

294-97
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states for corporate charters therefore encourages state law reforms that
are optimally consistent with shareholder interests.' 2 ' Thus, the model
has a built-in skepticism about the need for legal regulation designed to
protect shareholder interests.
The theory of the corporation sketched here conceives of the firm as
nothing more or less than the product of individual actors freely contracting according to their own utility calculations. Whether the terms
are supplied by actual bargaining or by the standard-form provisions of
state corporate law, market forces and individual choice determine the
outcomes. Corporate law rules should seek only to duplicate the terms
that individual shareholders and managers would have agreed upon if
they had engaged in actual bargaining. To the extent that other participants in corporate activity wish to protect their interests, freedom of contract allows them to do so. There is no legitimate reason for paternalistic
efforts to protect the parties to these contracts from their own bargains;
that protection would constitute imposition on the rights of all participants in the corporate enterprise to structure their relations according to
their own utility calculation. In particular, the freedom of contract principle precludes legal rules that seek to protect non-shareholders by limiting the shareholders' contractual freedom. If other participants in the
corporate enterprise feel the need for such protection, they are free to
bargain for it. By reducing corporate law to this particular conception of
contract law, the new theorists offer an elaborate justification for the now
familiar view that corporate activity and corporate law are purely private
matters. A conception of corporate law designed to pursue public objectives would lack legitimacy because public policy concerns should not be
allowed to intrude upon individual autonomy.122
The new economic theory of the corporation is thus a novel and
sophisticated version of the aggregate conception of the corporation that
has dominated corporate law discourse since the 1930s and has been interpreted to mean that corporate law should focus only on the welfare of
shareholders. The primacy of the aggregate theory is most evident in the
spectacular failure of the social responsibility movement of the 1960s. By
insisting on a privatized, shareholder-centered conception of corporate
law, the new economic theory carries forward the aggregate theory's
normative tradition.
121. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).

122. The nexus-of-contracts theorists rely on a model of contract obligation according to which
the parties' respective rights and duties are entirely defined by mutual consent. They ignore the
extent to which contract law contains mandatory principles that limit the parties' contractual freedom on the basis of public policy considerations.
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D. Hostile Takeovers and the Aggregate Theory of the Corporation123
1. The Debate Over Hostile Takeovers. Over the past decade, the
pace of hostile takeover activity has accelerated sharply. In the typical
hostile takeover, those seeking to seize control of a target corporation
offer generous premiums over market prices to target company shareholders willing to tender their stock. In contrast to a friendly merger, the
tender offeror (or bidder) appeals directly to the target's shareholders. In
this manner, bidders seek to obtain voting control without first obtaining
the blessing of the target's management.
The typical objective of recent takeover activity is the so-called
"bust-up" takeover. 124 Rather than continuing target company operations under new and more efficient management, the "bust-up" takeover
seeks to realize gains through large-scale asset liquidations or financial
restructurings. Takeovers motivated by such objectives are widely perceived to result in employee lay-offs, plant closings, or out-of-state removal of existing operations. Even successful efforts to defend against
unwelcome bids have resulted in significant employmerit cuts as a consequence of radical restructuring. Thus, despite the obvious attractiveness
of windfall premiums to target company shareholders, public concern
about hostile takeovers has centered on lost jobs and other less direct
ripple effects such as disruption of established customer and supplier relationships, lost tax revenues and corporate charitable contributions, and
destruction of other less tangible economic and social benefits.12 5State legislators have responded to these concerns by enacting increasingly bold legislation designed to curb hostile takeovers.1 26 Some
have suggested that the legislators who pass these laws are acting as toadies to locally influential corporate managers who stand to lose their positions if their companies are taken over. 127 The statutes themselves,
however, reveal clearly that they address a quite different set of concerns.
For example, a recent amendment to North Carolina's corporate statute
123. For a discussion of the relation between state takeover regulation and corporate theory, see
Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 806 (1989).
124. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 2-7 (1986) ("bust-up" motivation dominant). This development is related in part to the
ready availability of so-called "junk bond" financing. See Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age
of Finance Capitalism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11 (1987). As the junk bond market dries up, we
appear to be witnessing a decline in hostile takeover activity.
125. For a discussion of public opinion regarding hostile takeovers, see Romano, The Future of
Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457, 490-503 (1988).
126. See generally Johnson & Millon, Missing the PointAbout State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 846, 848 (1989) (arguing that the purpose of state antitakeover laws is to protect nonshareholders); Millon, supra note 15.
127. See, e.g., Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111 (1987).
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refers expressly to a broad range of issues, including lost employment,
tax revenues, and community service activities. 128 Similarly, Wisconsin's
anti-takeover statute candidly declares that Wisconsin corporations "encompass, represent and affect, through their ongoing business operations,
a variety of constitutencies including shareholders, employes, customers,
suppliers and local communities and their economies," and the statute
states further that it is intended "to promote the welfare of these constitutencies" and "should allow for the stable, long-term growth of resident
12 9
domestic corporations."
Most notably, several states have adopted provisions that, in effect,
redefine the role of a corporate board of directors confronted with a hostile takeover. Rejecting the standard idea that the board's fiduciary duty
requires it to get the best deal possible for the shareholders, regardless of
effects on non-shareholders, these new statutes provide expressly that the
board may consider such effects in deciding how to respond. A representative example begins by restating the conventional principle that a director shall discharge his or her duties in a manner reasonably believed to be
in the best interests of the corporation. The statute then proceeds to
redefine "the best interests of the corporation" in a radically innovative
manner:
A director may, in considering the best interests of a corporation, consider the effects of any action on shareholders, employees, suppliers,
and customers of the corporation, and communities in which offices or
128. The amendment reads:
Whereas, takeovers and takeover attempts of North Carolina corporations have been occurring with increasing frequency; and
Whereas, such activity can be highly disruptive to communities within North Carolina
by causing, among other things, high unemployment and erosion of the State and local
economy and tax base; and
Whereas, many of these corporations are not presently subject to the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act since while substantially present in North Carolina they are
chartered elsewhere; and
Whereas, these corporations offer employment to a large number of North Carolina
citizens who pay income taxes, property and other taxes; and
Whereas, these corporations pay significant amounts of income taxes to North Carolina; and
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial State and local property taxes; and
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial sales and use taxes in North Carolina;
and
Whereas, these corporations provide their North Carolina employees with health, retirement and other benefits; and
Whereas, these corporations and their employees contribute greatly to community
projects in North Carolina; and
Whereas, many unrelated businesses rely on these corporations to purchase goods and
services; and
Whereas, North Carolina has a vital interest in providing to these corporations the
benefits of the provisions of the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act; ....
1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 124.
129. Act of June 9, 1987, ch. 13, 1987 Wis. Laws 45.
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other facilities of the corporation are located, and any other factors the
130
director considers pertinent.

Arizona's similar statute appears to go even further, making consideration of non-shareholder interests mandatory rather than merely
permissive.

31

Developments in state common law governing target management
resistance to hostile bids also evidence a willingness to restrict takeover
activity for the sake of non-shareholders. In the important Unocal decision, the influential Delaware Supreme Court referred to the board's duty
to evaluate the threat to "the corporate enterprise" that a takeover
presents. 132 Besides considering such factors as adequacy of the tender
offer price and other issues of concern to shareholders, the court stated
that the board also may weigh the effects on various non-shareholder
constituencies. 133 Another court has stated that a board of directors confronted with a bust-up takeover threat must balance shareholder interests, on one hand, "and the legitimate concerns and interests of
employees and management.., who service the interests of investors, on
the other." 134 Nevertheless, the extent of courts' willingness to allow
management to take non-shareholder interests into account has been unclear.1 35 Common law decisions therefore have lagged behind statutory
36
developments in this regard.'
130. IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (1989) (amendment effective January 31, 1989). Note that this
provision is not limited to director action in hostile takeover situations. For similar provisions, see
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (amendment effective Aug. 23, 1985); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1989) (1985 amendment); OHIO REV. CODE ANN,
§ 1701.59(E) (Supp. 1989) (amendment effective Nov. 22, 1986); PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101 (effective
Oct. 1, 1989).
131. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1989) (amendment effective July 22, 1987).
132. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985).
133. Id The Delaware Supreme Court has since reiterated its adherence to this principle. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1985). In the only case in
which management has sought explicitly to justify its decision to prefer non-shareholder over shareholder interests under Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that under the circumstances the
board's duty was to the shareholders. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (once sale of the company appears inevitable, board's duty is to
auction the company to the highest bidder).
134. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also
Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707, 726 (5th Cir. 1984); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth,
Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980);
Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094-97 (10th Cir. 1972); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600
F. Supp. 678, 684-87 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Berman v. Gerber Prod., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D.
Mich. 1978).
135. See supra note 133.
136. For discussion of recent statutory and common law developments, see Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicialand Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J.CORP. L.
35 (1988).
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In response to concerns about the disruptive effects of hostile takeovers, a number of corporate law scholars argue forcefully against state
or federal regulation, emphasizing the benefits to shareholders and to the
general public of an unregulated, robust "market for corporate control."1 37 Most notably, of course, hostile tender offers present opportunities for shareholders to realize substantial premiums over the market
price of their stock. Shareholders, who have risked their capital by investing in stock, are simply earning their just rewards. In addition, the
credible threat of a takeover is said to encourage corporate management
diligently to maximize corporate profits and asset values in order to remove any incentives (in the form of depressed stock prices) to hostile
bidders. Whereas these shareholder-welfare claims are at the center of
arguments in favor of takeover activity, proponents also claim that society as a whole benefits from takeovers. Because successful takeovers reallocate corporate assets to higher valued uses, takeover activity is said to
enhance efficiency. Further, it is assumed that denial of access to takeover premiums would discourage participation in the stock market,
thereby increasing the costs of capital and leaving the American public
worse off.
2. Hostile Takeovers and Conventional Corporate Theory. Opposition to anti-takeover regulation starts from the proposition that shareholders occupy a privileged position within the network of relationships
constituting the corporation. As the owners (or, at least, the residual risk
bearers) who have entrusted management responsibilities to agents, it is
their financial interests that deserve priority over conflicting claims. If
shareholders occupy this privileged position, on what basis can one claim
to restrict their right to maximize the value of their investments? Property notions imply that shareholders should be free to realize the premiums that takeover bidders are willing to pay for their stock. Contract
and agency theory suggest that target company management should be
forbidden to stand in the way of shareholder access to such .premiums.
In the two-party, principal-agent, shareholder-manager world of conventional corporate law, it strikes many commentators as obvious that restrictions on takeover activity, as infringements on shareholder welfare to
which shareholders have not consented, are illegitimate. Although they
might disagree over which legal rules best protect shareholder interests in
137. The seminal article was Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor CorporateControl, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965). More recent contributions include Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a

Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. R

. 1161 (1981); Fischel,

Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 Tax. L. RyV. 1 (1978); Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers 33 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1981).
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hostile takeovers, there is no disagreement about the underlying premise-that shareholder welfare is the fundamental criterion.
Taking for granted that shareholder welfare is the touchstone
against which all corporate law rules are to be assessed, these scholars
largely ignore concerns about the harmful impact on non-shareholders.
Under the conventional conception of corporate law such concerns are
doctrinally irrelevant as well as politically uncongenial. To the extent
welfare of non-shareholders is acknowledged, it is asserted that losses
caused by takeovers are likely to be offset by creation of new employment
opportunities elsewhere. 138 Further, the aggregate benefits to society as a
whole that flow from more efficient use of productive resources outweigh
the localized costs of job losses and other temporary dislocations. To try
to address these concerns through corporate law not only would threaten
its doctrinal coherence, 139 but it also would assign to corporate law public law functions that are inconsistent with its private law character.
Yet, while one notion of the corporation as an aggregation of individual actors implies a shareholder-centered, anti-regulation policy toward hostile takeovers, the dominant conception of the corporation as an
aggregation rather than an entity also has contrary implications. Thinking about the corporation in terms of the collection of all the individuals
who contribute to production suggests a potentially broad conception of
the corporation, including management and lower level employees, as
well as holders of equity and debt securities. After all, to describe the
corporation as a nexus of contracts is to suggest far more than the vision
of the corporation as simply shareholders and their agent-managers.
Recent commentators have drawn on this broader conception of the
corporate aggregation to support several normative claims. Clyde Summers, for example, has revived arguments in favor of broader participation in corporate governance, describing the corporation as "an operating
institution combining all factors of production to conduct an ongoing
business" in which employees "are as much members of that enterprise
as shareholders."1 40 Similarly, a broad notion of the corporate aggrega138. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the NationalEconomy, 1988

Wis. L. REV. 467,

479.
139. Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware'sIntermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to ProportionalityReview?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 267 n.65 (1989).
140. Summers, Codeterminationin the United States: A Projectionof Problems andPotentials, 4
COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 155, 170 (1982). Other recent examples include M. AOKI,THE CoopERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 56-57 (1984); R. NADER, J. SELIGMAN & M. GREEN, supra
note 108, at 124-28; C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 174-83 (1975). For an earlier version of the
same argument, see supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
Advocates of shareholder primacy, while accepting an aggregate theory of the corporation, have
responded to arguments in favor of broader participation in corporate governance by focusing on the
unique position that shareholders occupy within the network of contracts. Unlike creditors, whose
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tion underlies Joseph Singer's argument in favor of according legal recognition to non-shareholder efforts to prevent corporate relocations.141 In
Singer's view, detrimental reliance by employees and local communities
on a corporation's implicit promise to provide employment and other
benefits is a basis for a structure of property rights in the corporate enterprise that embraces more people than simply the shareholders.
A broader interpretation of the aggregate theory of the corporation
also has been used to support anti-takeover regulation. Recent state laws
modify existing corporate law doctrines in order to take better account of
the losses non-shareholders are likely to suffer as a result of hostile takeovers. 14 2 Conceding that target company shareholders benefit from hostile takeovers, some commentators focus on the losses that nonshareholders suffer as a by-product of these benefits. 14 3 Their arguments
rest on a conception of the corporation that extends beyond the interests
of shareholders alone.
In a similar vein, some economic theorists suggest that shareholder
premiums derive, in part at least, from appropriation of the value of implicit promises of long-term job security. 144 Shareholder gains, in effect,
are paid for by middle management and lower-level employees whose
compensation has reflected their expectation of continued employment.
To the extent lay-offs result, the takeover frustrates these expectations
and allows the bidder to reap their value instead. Furthermore, although
shareholders can protect themselves from losses on particular investments by diversifying their stock portfolios, corporate employees invest
all of their "human capital" with a single employer and thus are unable
to diversify. They therefore stand to suffer losses in the event of a hostile
takeover that cannot be hedged against in ,advance. For some commenclaims are fixed, and employees, who are compensated according to agreed upon formulas, shareholder returns are inherently uncertain. As residual risk bearers, they stand to gain or lose if the
corporation does well or poorly. From this fact, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel argue that
shareholders alone have the incentives to make discretionary decisions about how the firm's resources should be deployed because it is they who have the most direct stake in such decisions. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 395, 403-06 (1983). Creditors
typically gain approval rights and preferred stockholders voting rights in circumstances in which
they (rather than the common shareholders) are in effect the residualrisk bearers. Id. at 404-05. To
accord.voting rights to other groups, such as employees, who ordinarily will not share in the marginal gains or losses caused by their decisions, would impede the shareholders' pursuit of wealth maximization. Id at 405-06.
141. See Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 701 (1988).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 126-31.
143. See Coffee, The Uncertain Casefor Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders; Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 440; Johnson & Millon, supra note 126, at 850, 853-57;
Millon, supra note 15, at 917-18; Singer, supra note 141, at 712.
144. See A. SCHLIEFER & L. SUMMERS, BREACH OF TRUST IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS (Nat'l
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2342, 1987); Coffee, supra note 124, at 73-86.
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tators, these findings may justify corporate law reforms that take these
non-shareholder interests into account.145 Needless to say, such arguments are premised on the notion that, at least under some circumstances, non-shareholders have a legitimate claim to corporate law's
attention, an idea that in turn is based on a broad conception of the corporate aggregation.
Although advocates of shareholder primacy in hostile takeovers
have tended simply to take their normative premise for granted, it is getting harder to ignore their opponents' arguments. As we have seen, the
argument that hostile takeovers are different from other corporate activity and therefore warrant special legal treatment is winning the day in
state legislatures 146 and perhaps in the courts, too.1 47 Accordingly, antiregulation scholars recently have begun to offer express justification for
shareholder priority over non-shareholder interests in hostile
148
takeovers.
Jonathan Macey, in a recent article criticizing legal regulation
designed to protect non-shareholders, does not dispute that non-shareholders suffer from hostile takeovers.1 49 He acknowledges that,
On the surface, few issues of corporate law present as appealing a case
for regulatory intervention as the effect of fundamental corporate
changes on non-shareholder constituencies. These changes can profoundly disrupt the lives of everyone connected to the firms that experience them; indeed, corporate change seems a paradigm of corporate
exploitation of innocent third parties. 15 0
Macey accepts the argument that target company shareholders in effect
appropriate "firm-specific capital investments" when they tender their
shares to a hostile bidder.151 His conclusion, however, is that non-shareholders are fully capable of protecting their interests through contracting, including collective bargaining in the case of rank-and-file
employees. Even in cases in which the party who has made a firm-specific investment that is adversely affected by a takeover is not in contractual privity with the target corporation (for example, a charitable
organization that has built a hospital or a local government that has built
roads and sewers), the relationship between the investor and the corporation can be structured so that the investor will receive adequate compen145. Coffee, supra note 124, at 81-86.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 126-31. 147. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
148. Macey, Externalities,Firm-Specific CapitalInvestments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental CorporateChanges, 1989 DUKE L.. 173, 197; Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate
Contract, 78 GEo. L.J. 71, 140 (1989).
149. Macey, supra note 148, at 173.
150. Id at 200.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
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sation. In any event, public law responses are unsuitable because they
cannot address with sufficient particularity the unique relationships between specific constituencies and firms. Further, Macey argues that protective legislation will do more harm than good because it will discourage
investment and ultimately result in fewer jobs as firms seek incorporation
in locations that lack such laws. The conclusion is the familiar one: Private ordering better serves society's interest in efficient resource allocation than does legislative intervention that claims to serve the public
152
interest.
Much of the political controversy surrounding the appropriate legal
response to hostile takeovers can be understood in terms of differing notions of the composition of corporate aggregation. Advocates and critics
of anti-takeover regulation alike have continued to tAlk about corporations in aggregate terms. -By focusing solely on the interests of shareholders, some opponents of regulation seem to imply that the corporation
is nothing but an aggregation of shareholders and managers. Proponents
of regulation think about the aggregation more broadly to include all
participants in the corporate enterprise. Their objective is to define the
corporation in a way that supports reform of corporate law governing
takeovers so as to protect the interests of non-shareholders, even at the
expense of shareholders. Thus, depending on how expansively one draws
the boundaries of the corporate aggregation, non-shareholder losses
caused by takeovers are either an appropriate concern for corporate law
or an irrelevant "externality.".
More sophisticated defenders of shareholder primacy do not dispute
the broader notion of the aggregation on which support for takeover regulation rests. The theory of the corporation that underlies Macey's position is an aggregate theory that depicts the corporation as nothing more
than a web of contractual relationships among real people. He frankly
acknowledges the relevance of claims by non-shareholders heard in the
policy debate and is unwilling simply to say that shareholders, whether
as property owners or as residual risk-bearers, should be entitled to takeover premiums regardless of their impact on non-shareholders.15 3 Where
Macey differs from the advocates of regulation is in his strongly diver152. While attempting to address directly the claims of non-shareholders for legislative protection from the effects of takeovers, Macey makes no effort to defend his underlying normative assumption-that allocative efficiency is the basic value against which social policy should be assessed.
Ribstein's analysis of non-shareholder interests in hostile takeover has a focus that differs from Macey's. Ribstein accepts Macey's normative assumption, but then argues that neither existing law nor
the "standard form contract" defining the relationship between shareholders and management allows the target board of directors to disregard shareholder interests in order to protect non-shareholders. Ribstein, supra note 148, at 140-50.
153. Macey, supra note 148.
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gent vision of the relationship among the participants in corporate activity. Macey's claim that non-shareholders can protect themselves by
contract implies that present contracts lacking such protection amount
to an acceptance of the risk of adverse effects, a risk for which they have
already received compensation. If shareholders and non-shareholders together have constructed this web in a manner that allows shareholders to
sell their stock to a hostile bidder regardless of the consequences for nonshareholders, they must have done so for self-interested reasons that are
entitled to respect. Advocates of regulation implicitly reject the assumptions about human relationships upon which this vision of the corporation rests. They deny that the various markets in which shareholders
and non-shareholders interact with each other function according to the
assumptions of the neoclassical model.
Thus, opponents and advocates of takeover regulation are able to
draw different normative implications from an expansive conception of
the corporate aggregation. Although these differences are significant,
even the advocates of legal restrictions on takeovers seem implicitly to
share with their adversaries a private conception of corporate activity.
The primary justification for intervention is the interests of the participants in the corporate enterprise who are believed to suffer from unregulated takeover activity. The claim that members of the general public
(local communities or consumers, for example) also suffer is secondary to
the focus on employees and creditors.
The opponents of regulation also treat public interest concerns only
secondarily. While focusing their primary attention on the claims of
shareholders, they also have argued that the market for corporate control
increases efficiency-a broader justification for takeovers that supposedly
appeals to all Americans. This argument has remained secondary, however. One reason is that it is too abstract: The theoretical efficiency
benefits seem too remote and speculative when laid next to actual, observable job losses and the like. A deeper reason also may explain the
tendency to downplay the efficiency justification. Once one concedes that
the public dimension is relevant to takeover policy, one implicitly seems
to acknowledge the relevance of public interest-based arguments that
might trump shareholder primacy. Thus, until recently, neither side in
the controversy surrounding hostile takeovers has chosen to base its position explicitly and primarily on a conception of the public interest and a
theory of corporate law as public law.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION
In this Part, I discuss at a more general level the significance of
theories of the corporation in light of the historical survey presented
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above, focusing primarily on Horwitz' argument about the legitimating
154
role and determinate meaning of theories of the corporation.
A. Legitimation
Horwitz argues that the natural entity theory of the corporation,
which attained prominence during the early decades of the 20th century,
legitimated an anti-regulatory conception of corporate law and the rise of
big business. To generalize his argument, theories about "what corporations are" influence thinking about how the law should treat corporate
activity. In this way, particular theories of the corporation are perceived
to justify particular legal rules or, at a more general level, a particular
approach to regulation. Although the legitimation claim is a plausible
interpretation (as presented by Horwitz and others in its more general
form), the historical survey presented above suggests that the connection
between corporate theory and doctrinal and social developments is, in
fact, a good deal more complex. We have yet to develop an adequate
account of corporate theory's legitimating function.
Legal theories differ from legal rules because legal theories set forth
a positive or descriptive assertion about the world-an assertion about
what corporations are. Normative implications are then said to follow
from the positive assertion. Thus, for example, because a corporation is
an artificial entity, the state ought to be free to impose regulations on
corporate activity deemed necessary to serve the public interest. Or, because the corporation is nothing but a nexus of contracts among private
individuals, the state should not interfere with the parties' autonomy by
imposing restrictions on their freedom of contract. Particular theories of
the corporation therefore provide a standard for evaluating actual or proposed legal rules. In other words, corporate theory can be used to legitimate or criticize corporate doctrine. The extent to which normative
claims like these are perceived to follow in a determinate way from the
underlying positive assertion is controversial,15 5 but the form of argument is common enough for us to be justified in assuming that at least
some amount of rhetorical force lies behind it.
Still, we need to see that theories of the corporation are not developed in an intellectual vacuum that is somehow prior to their deployment in particular arguments about legal doctrine. One of the most
important formative elements of corporate theory is legal doctrine itself.
Corporations are not just instances of collective action; their attributes
are largely a product of positive law. For example, extensive regulation
154. See Horwitz, supra note 5.
155. See infra Part III.B.
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through the chartering process suggested that corporations were artificial
entities,1 56 whereas easily available general incorporation procedures and
the abandonment of regulation supported claims about the "natural"
character of corporate enterprise.1 57 Thus, it seems clear that when we
talk about changes in legal theories of the corporation, we are, at least in
part, talking about changes in legal doctrine that are interpreted as indications of a rejection of an existing theory in favor of a new one. Corporate theory manifests itself through corporate doctrine.
For Horwitz, the principal evidence for the triumph of the natural
entity theory is its manifestation in several doctrinal areas. For example,
"the demise both of the ultra vires doctrine as well as of constitutional
restrictions on foreign corporations was an expression of the triumph of
the natural entity theory."1 58 This interpretation seems plausible: Doctrinal developments reflected a general change in thinking about what
corporations are. Yet Horwitz also makes a further claim. He writes
that the new theory of the corporation facilitated particular doctrinal developments by making them appear acceptable and perhaps necessary.
In other words, because people thought about the corporation as a natural entity, they were more willing to tolerate removal of legal regulation
than they otherwise would have been.1 59 The implication is that acceptance of the new theory preceded the doctrinal changes themselves because people appealed to the theory in the effort to remake corporate law
in a manner more conducive to the interests of big business. This view is
plausible, but the evidence for the theory's prior existence cannot be the
very developments that it is supposed to have assisted in bringing about.
In other words, Horwitz' legitimation interpretation seems to imply a
claim about causation and priority that is unwarranted by the evidence
on which he relies.
Horwitz' research actually demonstrates that the new theory and its
particular manifestations emerged and developed more or less simultaneously, each feeding on the other in a dynamic, interdependent process.
The gradual acceptance of a new legal theory of the corporation (together with other social and political phenomena) encouraged receptivity
toward new legal rules, while the new rules (again, together with other
factors) themselves encouraged people to think about the corporation in
a new way. All this was happening at the same time: The new theory
legitimated the new doctrine as doctrine was legitimating theory. Our
156. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21, 32-45.

157. See supra text accompanying notes 46-58.
158. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 221.
159. See, ag., id. at 223 (entity theory made possible the justification for replacement of share-

holder unanimity requirement for mergers).

Vol. 1990:201]

THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION

ideas about what corporations are provide us with a critical perspective
toward corporate doctrine. At the same time, particular instances of corporate doctrine are interpreted to imply that one theory, rather than another, more appropriately captures what is essential or characteristic
about corporations. The process looks a good deal more complex than
indicated by Horwitz' simplistic reference to the natural entity theory's
legitimating function.
The same sort of interdependence characterizes the relationship between corporate theory and social practice. Again, Horwitz argues that
"a 'natural entity' theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating big business."' 16 In other words, a new conception of the corporation as natural helped to prevent or defuse criticism of the newlyemergent corporate giants that otherwise would have occurred. William
Bratton responds that it is equally plausible to assert "[a] counter picture
of practice determining theory [that] finds support in the relationships
between economic changes at the turn of the century and the several
levels of the theory of the corporate firm." 16 1 There is nothing wrong
with either position, as long as one keeps in mind that there is no need to
insist on one or the other. Theories about the corporation depend in
large part on perceptions of what corporations look like. Law embodies
beliefs about what is legitimate, and these beliefs influence the way people behave. 162 Legal theory shapes social practice and practice informs
theory-at the same time.
B. Determinacy
In addition to his argument about legitimation, Horwitz also makes
a case for the determinate significance of particular legal theories of the
corporation.163 His argument is that the natural entity theory better supported a private law, anti-regulatory conception of corporate law and the
rise of big business than did any of the other available alternative
theories. In other words, that theory (and, by implication, theories of the
corporation generally) had a definite normative implication or tilt. Our
world would have taken a different shape had the triumph of the natural
entity theory not occurred.
Horwitz does not claim that the various theories of the corporation
each have essential, necessary meanings that somehow dictate particular
normative implications in a mechanical, nondiscretionary manner.
160.
161.
162.
Space:
163.

Id. at 176.
Bratton, New Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 1511-13.
For a provocative discussion of how this is so, see Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional
What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. Rnv. 1 (1989).
See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 175-76.
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Instead, he seeks to demonstrate the error of claims that all legal concepts are inherently indeterminate and therefore capable of simultaneously sustaining contradictory normative assertions. His point is that
legal theories, like legal rules, exist in concrete social and historical contexts. At any time, there are generally accepted understandings or conventions about the meaning of particular legal theories that are
analogous to the generally accepted understandings of particular words
or other abstract concepts: "[W]hen abstract conceptions are used in
specific historical contexts they have more limited meanings and more
specific argumentative functions." 164 The effort to use a legal theory (by
making a claim that it supports a particular normative position) unavoidably involves interpretation of the theory's meaning, but these shared understandings provide the context within which interpretation takes place.
Context supplies meaning and thus limits the implications that can be
drawn persuasively from a legal theory (or, in the same way, from a legal
rule). This is why, according to Horwitz, "most important controversial
legal abstractions do have determinate legal or political significance." ' 16 5
Horwitz' claims about determinate significance parallel recent efforts to ground law's objectivity in societal or professional convention.
Drawing on Wittgenstein's idea of "interpretive communities," scholars
such as Stanley Fish and Owen Fiss have asserted that understandings
shared by community members constrain interpretive activity. 166 The
164. Id. at 176.
165. Id. at 175-76. Horwitz seeks to counter those who have been perceived to argue that legal
concepts are wholly indeterminate, their meaning in any particular application entirely a function of
the interpreter's point of view:
We have spent too much effort repeating the demonstrations of the indeterminacy of concepts in a logical vacuum; but not enough time trying to show that in particular contexts
the choice of one theory over another is not random or accidental because history and
usage have limited their deepest meanings and applications.
Id. at 176. Horwitz cites the following articles as examples of the strong indeterminacy claim he
wishes to refute: Dalton, An Essay in Deconstructionof ContractDoctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 100607 (1985); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685,
1731-38 (1976); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25
(1984); Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 568-70 (1983).
166. Fish and Fiss have been the most notable proponents of this view. See S. FIsH, DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989) (arguing against foundationalist accounts of meaning); Fiss,
Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177 (1985) (conventional understanding as source of objectivity in legal discourse); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (same).
While Fiss seems to rely on Fish's work, Fish has criticized Fiss's explanation of how convention
constrains legal interpretation. Fiss focuses on the notion of "disciplining rules" that distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate interpretation. See Fiss, Conventionalism, supra, at 183-96. Fish points
out that such rules cannot limit interpretation because they themselves must be interpreted. See S.
FISH, supra, at 120-40. However, what unites the two is their belief that membership in an interpretive community unavoidably involves a shared commitment to common undertandings that shape
the members' interpretive activities. See also Radin, Reconsideringthe Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. REV.
781 (1989) (discussing Wittgensteinian "social practice" conception of rules); Stick, Can Nihilism Be
Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 332, 369-83 (1986) (discussing "group objectivity"); Solum, On the
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conventionalist account responds to assertions of law's indeterminacy by
attempting to give an explanation for the general (though not unrelenting) predictability of legal results, as well as the experience of interpretive
constraint that all lawyers and judges routinely experience. Conventionalists seek to do this without falling back on the now discredited notions
that words and other concepts have "essential" meanings, which are capable of nondiscretionary understanding, or that rational, neutral procedures can ensure the objectivity of legal interpretation. Conventionalists
thus offer a middle ground between foundationalist and so-called nihilist
accounts of legal reasoning.

Legal theories, such as theories of the corporation, present problems
of interpretation when someone makes a normative claim to the effect

that the theory justifies (or fails to justify) a particular legal rule or social
practice. For example, suppose a state legislature is concerned about the

disruptive effects of hostile takeovers on target company employees. To
address this concern, the legislature is considering an amendment to the
general incorporation statute that will impose a new form of restriction

on shareholders' freedom to respond to tender offers. A critic of the
proposed amendment then makes the following argument: "Because a

corporation is nothing more than a nexus of contracts among private
individuals, the state should not impose restrictions (in the form of
mandatory rules) on the parties' freedom to structure their relationship
according to their own utility calculations." As an initial matter, one can

challenge the premise (that the corporation is a "nexus of contracts").
But, assuming for the moment that the premise is uncontroversial beIndeterminacy Crisis: CritiquingCriticalDogma, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 462, 476-81 (1987) (discussing
"community agreement").
The interpretive community on which conventionalist accounts rely is, presumably, the community ofjudges, legislators, practicing lawyers, and legal scholars to whom our culture assigns primary
responsibility for the authoritative analysis, criticism, and application of legal concepts. Besides Fish
and Fiss, several scholars have sought conventionalism's shared understandings in the pragmatic
reasoning practices characteristic of the legal profession. See Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law
or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L. REv. 35 (1981); Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 835 (1987); Kronman, PracticalWisdom and ProfessionalCharacter,4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
203 (1986); Posner, The JurisprudenceofSkepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827 (1988); Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. CoLo. L. REV. 45
(1985). Conventionalism's reliance on the legal profession as the source for authoritative interpretation has suggested one line of criticism. See Brest, Interpretationand Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv.
765, 770-72 (1982) (legal profession's narrow political interests); Michelman, Bringing the Law to
Life: A Pleafor Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. Rav. 256, 266 (1989) (legal profession's doubtful
commitment to public as opposed to "craft" values). For additional critical assessments of conventionalism, see Cornell, Institutionalizationof Meaning, Recollective Imaginationand the Potentialfor
TransformativeLegal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135, 1139-40 (1988) (conventionalism's
failure to establish a normative justification for its appeal to community's authority); Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and CriticalLegal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REv. 724 (1988) (conventionalism's noncritical perspective).
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cause that theory is generally accepted (in fact it is not), the normative
claim then depends on interpretation of this theory of the corporation.
What are its legitimate normative implications? If the theory has "determinate significance," then the normative assertion is either right or
wrong (or, at least, more or less one or the other).
The conventionalist would say that the nexus-of-contracts theory of
the corporation does have determinate significance because the legal theory (like a legal rule) has a generally accepted meaning that embraces
some implications and excludes the rest. An individual seeking to assess
the theory's implications with respect to this concrete problem (such as a
legislator, lobbyist, or anyone else concerned enough about the question
to worry about it) has to make a judgment about how the general concept
relates to the specific question. Of course, the individual decisionmaker
is free to reach a judgment based on personal preference, but the conventional understanding of the theory's implications will provide a standard
against which that judgment may be evaluated and criticized. If the decisionmaker wants to persuade anyone that his or her judgment is correct,
it will be necessary to offer arguments designed to show that the judg167
ment is consistent with the generally accepted meaning of the theory.
Like the meaning of the theory itself, the perceived quality of such arguments will depend on conventional notions about the persuasive force of
particular moral and political claims, as well as forms of argument and
other rhetorical techniques. Thus, the conventionalist explanation allows
us to see why a particular legal theory of the corporation may have determinate significance, even though there is nothing inevitable about its
meaning in any transcendental, ahistorical sense.
Unless the question is generally perceived to be novel and therefore
controversial, we can predict with some confidence that conventional understanding will yield a result that is generally accepted. To return to
our example, our intuitive response to the argument (again, assuming the
premise) is that it is correct. Legal scholars have repeatedly used the
nexus-of-contracts theory as a basis for criticism of just this sort of legislation. We readily can imagine a whole range of arguments against that
result, but as the theory has been developed and elaborated so far, its
implications with respect to this problem are reasonably clear. Someone
seeking to dispute the argument would make more headway focusing on
the validity of its premise-whether the nexus-of-contracts theory is an
appropriate way to think about corporations.
Horwitz' conventionalist account of legal meaning contributes to
our understanding of the rise'of big business in the early 20th century. A
167. See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication: A CriticalPhenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 530 (1986).
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particular theory of the corporation gained prominence, and that theory
was perceived to imply the legitimacy of novel doctrinal and social developments. Other possible theories would have provided a basis from
which to criticize these developments, but those theories were perceived
to be less accurate descriptions of the corporation. Even if one acknowledges that the choice among theories itself was affected by doctrinal and
social developments (at the same time that the theory was facilitating
those developments),1 68 Horwitz' analysis is still useful because it rejects
the claim that legal theories possess indeterminate meanings and thus
exert no influence on historical development. To the contrary, by showing how the natural entity theory's normative implications were worked
out in a concrete historical setting, Horwitz offers a demonstration of the
importance of legal theory (as well as other factors, of course) in shaping
our social existence.
We should not, however, draw the wrong lesson from Horwitz'
claims about the determinate significance of legal theory. From the perspective of hindsight, one can see that a particular theory had a particular, limited set of normative implications at a particular time in the past.
But our confidence in making this observation about history should not
obscure the fundamental indeterminacy of legal theory (and legal rules)
that lies at the heart of the conventionalist description of legal argument.
By relying on communal understanding as the source of objectivity, conventionalism offers a purely historicist account of meaning. At any point
in time, the meaning of a legal concept is subject to whatever revision the
interpretive community deems to be appropriate and desirable. And the
members of the community are themselves responsible for generating the
shared understandings that limit their own thinking. There are no constraints on this process except the community's own beliefs about what is
good, and those beliefs, too, are subject to ongoing critique and revision.
The historian can describe the ways in which particular legal ideas were
interpreted in the past and, in that sense, ended up having a "determinate" meaning. But, for us, living in the present, we must keep in mind
that we-the interpretive community-determine the meaning of legal
theories and legal rules. Legal concepts determine nothing but that
1 69
which we allow them to determine.
This is not to say that the members of an interpretive community
are free at any time to reject conventional meaning and substitute an
168. See supra Part III.A.
169. The reference to "we" masks a problem lurking within conventionalist accounts of legal
thought. The parameters of the relevant interpretive community are uncertain. More important,
whatever its precise boundaries might be, that community is arguably too narrow and exclusive to
confer legitimacy on the authority that its interpretive activities enjoy in a purportedly democratic
society. See supra note 166.
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entirely new set of conventional understandings in its place. Context is
not susceptible to wholesale, external critique because we never can transcend entirely the conventional beliefs that our interpretive traditions impose upon us. 170 Nevertheless, the context itself is not as narrowly
constraining as the inevitability of context might seem to imply. This is
so for two reasons.
First, at any point in time any legal concept contains within it a
broad range of interpretive potential capable of sustaining strongly subversive normative argument. 171 To take an example from the history of

corporate theory sketched above, during the 1930s advocates of corporate social responsibility relied expressly on a novel interpretation of the
then current entity conception of the corporation. Despite the entity
theory's pro-big business tilt,1 72 critics devised a new interpretation of the
theory that supported the notion of the corporation as a citizen and of
management's duty as a duty to the corporate entity, rather than directly
to its shareholders. 17 3 The point was to argue that corporations ought to

be subject to public obligations despite the cost to shareholders. Here is
an example of the use of a generally accepted legal theory to support a
position antithetical to the conventional understanding of that theory's
normative implications. The constraints of context did not preclude the
argument; to the contrary, context contained within it sharply conflicting
possibilities. Legal theories are not determinate in the sense of possessing
only a single normative tilt.
A variation on this attribute of legal theories is the fact that, like the
normative implications of a particular theory, the acceptability of a given
theory is itself contestable. In other words, just as a particular theory
can be interpreted in sharply contrasting ways, the idea of the corporation is also subject to contradictory interpretations. For example, during
the early decades of this century the description of the corporation as an
entity gained general acceptance, meaning that this interpretation (rather
170. Fish, of course, has made this point repeatedly. See generally S. FISH, supra note 166. As
explained below, one of the defects of his theory is his unwillingness to acknowledge the room for

various critical perspectives that are possible despite the limits that convention imposes upon us.
For further discussion of this point (as well as additional critical insights), see Winter, Bull Durham
and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990).
171. Cf R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 15-22, 88-90 (1986) (discussing practice of "deviationist doctrine" as recognition and development of principles and counterprinciples present in any body of law); Cornell, supra note 166, at 1196-1212 (describing legal
interpretation as "recollective imagination" based on the normative potential embodied in existing
law). It is also possible that new normative insights transcending existing context can be generated

through flashes of creative insight that Richard Rorty analogizes to genetic mutation. See R.
RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 17 (1989).

172. See supra Part II.B.1.
173. See supra Part II.B.2.

Vol. 1990:201]

THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION

than the alternative aggregate theory) came to be thought of as the better
way of describing corporations. 174 This theory was interpreted as implying a private law, deregulatory conception of corporate law. When proponents of corporate social responsibility showed how the entity theory
could be used to support their position, the private law, shareholder primacy advocates responded by jettisoning the entity theory and reconceptualizing the corporation as an aggregation so as to focus on the property
rights of shareholders. 175 The aggregate theory of the corporation was in
this way interpreted as implying a shareholder-centered, deregulatory
conception of corporate law. Thus, as people struggled with the normative implications of the entity theory during the 1930s, a new description
of the corporation emerged that ended up replacing it. Corporations had
not changed, but their meaning did.
Besides the variety of possible interpretations of a theory and the
possibility of choice among different theories, a second reason indicates
why interpretive context is less determinate than conventionalist accounts of law seem to imply. Even if we accept that existing understandings will shape efforts to choose between alternative intepretations of
particular theories or of social phenomena, we must be careful what we
mean by this idea. Interpretive context does not provide a priori answers
to its own questions. It is not a rigid template against which novel normative claims are evaluated and then accepted or rejected. Because it
assumes a false dichotomy between subject (interpreter) and object (interpretive context), this view is just another version of formalism. It fails
to acknowledge the extent to which the meaning of the context itself depends on the questions asked of it. While routine questions may yield
routine and predictable answers, a novel problem will cause us unavoidably to think about normative convention in novel ways.' 76 An extreme
example is the challenge that recent events in Eastern Europe present to
conventional beliefs about East-West relations and U.S. domestic policy
priorities. Even though these conventional beliefs guide our evaluation
of particular policy questions, the beliefs themselves have been altered
forever by the very events that have generated the questions.
At a more particular level, any legal argument involves differing
views about the implications of a legal concept and therefore unavoidably
involves interpretation and evaluation (rather than mere observation) of
the concept's meaning. In other words, however strong our unconscious
174. See supra Part II.B.1.
175. See supra Part II.C.
176. See Cornell, supra note 166, at 1200-06 (meaning of legal concepts is developed through
their conjectural application to new situations); Radin, supra note 166 (rejecting formalist accounts
of rule application); Tribe, supra note 162, at 17-20 (impossibility of detached observation).
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assumptions abouit the "naturalness" or "necessity" of current arrangements might be, the interpretive context is ever shifting in response to
concrete, practical application. Interpretive convention, while shaping
our responses to new problems, is itself constantly and inevitably being
refashioned. These changes may be tentative and incremental, but the
point is that the context is not fixed and therefore not determinate in that
sense. Legal theories do not determine their own meanings.
The present controversy over hostile takeovers illustrates both of
these aspects of indeterminacy. 177 Opponents of regulation insist on the
right of shareholders to obtain the benefits of tender offers, resting their
case on the now orthodox aggregate conception of the corporation that
focuses solely on the interests of shareholders. Meanwhile, critics of
iakeover activity emphasize the harms sustained by non-shareholders.
They too conceive of the corporation as an aggregation, but they describe
the aggregation in much more expansive terms, seeking thereby to take
into account the interests of all those participants in the corporate enterprise who stand to lose as a result of a hostile takeover. One aspect of
this controversy is a choice among the conflicting normative implications
that each side in the debate seeks to draw out of the aggregate theory of
the corporation. That theory itself has been reshaped by the hostile takeover phenomenon. While both sides appeal to a conception of the corporation that was created long before the takeover controversy arose, the
aggregate theory now contains meaning and implication that it did not
possess twenty years ago. It is no longer possible to think about the
corporate aggregation in a way that fails to reflect recent controversy
over the rights of non-shareholders. The meaning of theory has changed
by the very act of its application to new problems.
Decisions about the normative implications of legal theories, and
indeed choices among theories themselves, take place against the background of interpretive conventions that are constantly shifting. Even if
we accept the general notion of a context that limits our beliefs about
what is desirable, we need to keep in mind the context's dynamic, malleable property. In light of these attributes, the present debate about hostile
takeovers, as well as the history of corporate theory, should caution us
against concluding too readily that particular legal theories have a single
or even a dominant tilt. While at any point in time contemporaries possess a reasonably restricted sense of a theory's implications, at just those
times when the question takes on the greatest importance-that is, in the
midst of hotly contested public policy controversies-normative implication seems to be contestable at a very basic level, as does the choice of
177. See supra Part II.D.
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theory itself. After the dust has settled, we can look back and say that
legal thinkers interpreted a given theory in a way that lent support to
particular doctrinal and social phenomena. In that sense, the theory had
determinate significance. But that perspective should not cause us to forget that during the controversy the theory itself could not determine its
own meaning, let alone its effects on society. Such questions are determined by rhetoric and political vision, not logic.
To acknowledge these insights is to recognize the futility of arguments over whether legal theories are determinate or indeterminate because, under the conventionalist account, they are boti constraining and
subject to ongoing, inevitable critique and revision at the same time. Instead of arguing about whether legal theories or legal rules are "radically
indeterminate," "loosely determinate," or something else, we should be
thinking further about the role that legal concepts, such as theories of the
corporation, play in important public policy controversies. We also
could benefit from a better understanding of how and why it is that legal
ideas are perceived by the people who use them to foreclose some normative possibilities while allowing others. Insisting on the internal contradictions embodied in legal doctrine is beside the point. Instead, the
challenge is to learn more about how convention mediates opposing tendencies and, further, how the balance is constantly being readjusted.
Convention's indeterminate nature invites lawyers, judges, and
scholars, as members of an interpretive community, to use their critical
and creative faculties and their persuasive abilities to take full advantage
of the transformative potential within existing context. Conservative
academics have been doing a good job of practical theorizing in recent
years. 178 Critical scholars, however, have not done nearly enough to apply their theoretical insights to important practical problems.1 79 State
judges and legislators have responded creatively and effectively to the
hostile takeover challenge and have resisted the efforts of the anti-regulation academics, but critical scholars can take little credit for these
developments.
IV.

THE TIME CASE AND THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF CORPORATE

LAW
In the widely publicized Time case, Chancellor Allen's Chancery
Court decision allowed Time's management to block a hostile tender of178. I am referring to the efforts to apply economic theory to doctrinal analysis and criticism.
For examples, see the articles written by Easterbrook, Fischel, Gilson, Kraakman, and Macey cited
supra notes 137-40.
179. Singer, supra note 141 (applying critical legal perspective to plant closing problem), is an
important exception.
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fer, despite its apparent attractiveness to Time's shareholders. 0 The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, 181 issuing its opinion in February
1990.12 Given the circumstances of the case, its outcome presents
something of a puzzle because it is difficult to square with corporate law's
orthodox shareholder primacy principle. While the supreme court's
opinion fails to offer a convincing rationale for this apparent departure, it
is possible to read Allen's opinion in a way that suggests a creative alternative to the conventional private, shareholder-centered conception of
corporate law. This alternative appears to acknowledge the public significance of corporate activity and corporate law and to respond accordingly. The reading of Allen's opinion that I offer here does not purport
to be an explication of Allen's own views. Rather, it demonstrates the
interpretive possibilities contained in particular legal pronouncements.
Further, read as suggested below, Allen's opinion exemplifies the creative, transformative potential inherent in the existing legal context.
As we have seen, one way to address concerns about the harmful
effects of corporate takeovers is to redefine the corporate-aggregation in a
more expansive manner by taking into account employees (and perhaps
others too), as well as managers and shareholders. 18 3 By so doing, the
impact of the hostile takeover on non-shareholder participants in the corporate enterprise becomes a relevant concern and therefore an appropriate subject for corporate law. Because this approach to the takeover
problem continues to rely on a conception of the corporation as an aggregation of private individuals and focuses solely on the interests of those
participants in the corporate enterprise who are affected by hostile takeovers, its attention is limited to the private relationships that constitute
corporate activity. Although addressing a broader range of private interests than was previously considered desirable, these new instances of regulation through the mechanisms of corporate law do not necessarily
imply a recognition of the public dimension of corporate activity and
corporate law.
Although a public law conception of corporate law has not been the
dominant justification for anti-takeover regulation, even before Time
there have been signs that such a view may be reemerging. Several of the
state anti-takeover statutes refer vaguely to public or community interest,
as well as to the more concrete interests of particular non-shareholder
constituencies in takeover targets. 184 Judicial responses to takeovers also
180.
(CCi)
181.
182.
183.
184.

Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94,514, at 93,264 (Del. Ch. 1989).
565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 (Del. 1990).
See supra text accompanying notes 14045.
See, e'g., supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
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have hinted at a new appreciation of the public aspect of the problem
and, accordingly, a public law justification for legal intervention. Unocal
itself referred to "the community generally" as a possible object of target
board solicitude.18 More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court noted
that management might refuse to entertain offers for several reasons, including "the alternatives available and their effect on various constituencies, particularly stockholders; the company's long-term strategic plans;
18 6
and any other factors bearing on stockholder and public interests."'
Most notable, however, may be Chancellor Allen's decision in the Time
case. 187
Like all the recent takeover cases,188 Time involved a claim by a
frustrated bidder (Paramount Communications) that the target's (i.e.,
Time's) board had wrongfully blocked access to the target's shareholders, thereby preventing the shareholders from realizing a substantial premium on their stock, precluding the bidder from gaining control of the
target, and entrenching incumbent management. Time's management
had negotiated a friendly merger agreement with Warner Communications, purportedly in order to diversify the scope of its operations and
expand into international markets. When Paramount's unwelcome
tender offer for Time appeared on the scene, Time and Warner restructured their deal in a way that avoided the vote by Time's shareholders
that a merger would have required. 189 In this way, Time could go ahead
with the acquisition without fear that shareholders who preferred to accept Paramount's offer would vote against the combination. Paramount
alleged that Time's management acted in this fashion in order to preserve
its position of control. Paramount also claimed that its offer, which
eventually reached $200 per share, far exceeded the value that Time's
stock would have after the combination with Warner.
In declining to enjoin Time's completion of its acquisition of
Warner's stock, Allen and the supreme court accepted the view that
Time's management had changed the mechanism by which it would
merge with Warner in order to prevent Time's shareholders from voting
185. See infra text accompanying note 195; see also supra note 134.
186. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1989).

187. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 (Del. 1990).
188. See, ag., MillsAcquisition, 559 A.2d at 1261; City Capital Assocs. L.P. v. Interco, Inc., 551
A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed as moot, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
189. While structured so as not to require a vote under Delaware law, the transaction nevertheless required the approval of Time's shareholders pursuant to New York Stock Exchange rules.
Time, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. S 94,938, at 95,205.
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against the combination so that they would be able to accept Para-

mount's tender offer. 190 Thus, the legal issue was to evaluate manage-

ment's defensive response to the Paramount bid under Delaware's

Unocal standard. 19 1 Unocal provides that, before the business judgment

rule will be applied to a target board's defensive measure, the board must
first prove (i) reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed, and (ii) that the defensive measure was a
proportionately reasofiable response to the threat presented. 92
The Time plaintiffs argued that the only legally cognizable threats

under Unocal are inadequate price or shareholder coercion.1 93 Under
this view, Time's management should not have blocked Paramount's
generously priced all-cash, all-shares bid. The supreme court rejected

this reading of Unocal as too narrow, 194 reminding the plaintiffs that

Unocal itself spoke in broader terms: In determining whether a particular hostile bid presents a threat justifying a defensive response, the board
may consider a range of factors besides low price or coercion, including
the "nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (4e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation and the quality of securities being offered in the
195
exchange."
If not inadequate price or coercion, what threat justified management's blocking strategy in Time? The supreme court's opinion offers
surprisingly little analysis of this question. Clinging to a shareholder
protection rationale, the opinion refers to possible shareholder ignorance
or confusion about the respective merits of the Paramount bid and the
Warner transaction, 196 though not very convincingly. There was no
compelling reason why the terms or circumstances of Paramount's bid
disabled Time's shareholders from weighing it against the speculative,
much longer-term benefits of the union with Warner. The supreme
190. Id at 95,209; Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

94,514, at 93,273-74.

191. Both courts also rejected the plaintiffs' argument (based on Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173) that
Time's management owed a duty to its shareholders to auction the company to the highest bidder.
See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. %94,938, at 95,208-09; Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

94,514, at 93,278-81.

192. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
193. See Time, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,938, at 95,209-10. Coercion can arise where the bidder
makes a so-called two-tier bid, in which the offer is to purchase a percentage of target company stock
for cash in the first stage of the transaction, to be followed by a second stage in which the remaining
shareholders will receive less attractive consideration for their stock. In this way, two-tier bids encourage target shareholders to tender in the first stage, in order to avoid adverse treatment in the
second stage. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. Two tier bids have been rare in recent years. See
Johnson & Millon, supra note 126, at 846-47.
194. Fed. See. L. Rep. 94,938, at 95,210.

195. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
196. Fed. See. L. Rep. 94,938, at 95,210.
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court's opinion seems instead to rest primarily on a fundamental commitment to managerial prerogative. The powers of Time's management
should include the power to preserve the attractive, carefully considered
Warner deal, which the Paramount bid obviously ttireatened.197 Thus,
the threat that justified management's defensive response under Unocal
was a threat to management's power to decide the corporation's future
direction.
The Unocal analysis in Time thus suggests a distinction between
threats to corporate interests and to shareholderinterests. Delaware jurisprudence has long described management's fiduciary duties as owing
to "the corporation and its shareholders." 198 The meaning of the distinction (if indeed one was intended) has never been explained. Instead, the
interests of the corporation and of its shareholders have been assumed to
be at least generally congruent. If the corporation does well, so do the
shareholders and the other corporate constitutencies. Likewise, a threat
to the corporation is also a threat to its shareholders. Since the advent of
hostile takeovers, this assumed identity of interest has no longer been
tenable. 19 9 Takeovers in which the transaction depends on busting up
the company or taking on an enormous debt burden present in dramatic
relief a conflict between the shareholders' desire to cash in immediately
by accepting a hostile bid and the continued welfare of non-shareholder
constituencies. A policy judgment is unavoidable, and Time subordinates short-term shareholder interests to corporate interests.
To read the supreme court's opinion in this way only raises a further, more fundamental question: Why should target company management enjoy this power to block a hostile bid? What justifies
management's broad powers to preserve the corporate enterprise, in the
face of shareholder preference for the bidder's offer of an immediate and
substantial gain? The supreme court offers precious little in the way of a
response. Beyond cases of inadequate price or coercion, shareholder welfare does not convincingly justify such power. Nor does it suffice simply
to cite § 141(a) of Delaware's corporation law, which assigns to the
board the responsibility to manage the "business and affairs" of the
197. See id. (discussing the Time board's efforts to inform itself about the company's objectives
and the optimal "fit" that the Warner transaction offered).
198. See, eg., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (directors' power "carries with it
certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and it shareholders"); Guth v. Loft, 23
Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (corporate officers and directors stand in a fiduciary
relation to the corporation and its stockholders).
199. See TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
94,334, at 92,178 & n.5 (Del. Ch. 1989). See generally Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who are They For?,43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 781 (1986) (divergence of shareholder and nonshareholder interests in the takeover context).
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corporation. 2°° If the corporation is to be managed for the shareholders'
benefit, which is the conventional assumption, the board arguably oversteps its statutory responsibility when it precludes shareholder access to
an attractive tender offer. Because it seems so obviously to challenge this
conventional assumption, the supreme court's Time opinion begs the
very question it raises and for that reason creates more uncertainty than
it resolves.
To begin to imagine what values might legitimate the result in Time,
it may be instructive to return to Allen's opinion. 20 1 In the trial court,
Time's management had suggested that the Warner transaction would
ultimately be worth more to the shareholders than would a takeover by
Paramount, but these long-term gains were necessarily uncertain and
speculative. 20 2 In addition, Time's management emphasized a quite different argument, the desirability of preserving a "distinctive and important 'Time culture.' "203 As described by Allen, "[T]his culture appears
in part to be pride in the history of the firm-notably Time Magazine
and its role in American life-and in part a managerial philosophy and
distinctive [corporate] structure that is intended to protect journalistic
integrity from pressures from the business side of the enterprise. ' '2 4
Time director Matina S. Homer, then president of Radcliffe College, emphasized the broader significance of Time's commitment to editorial
independence:
I believe that editorial freedom free from political or other kinds of
intervention is absolutely essential if members of our society are to be
enlightened enough to form wise judgments and fulfill their responsibilities as citizens. I believe that the need to foster a literate and informed citizenry is the sine qua non of this nation's and the company's
future. 20 5
Horner went on to suggest that Time's survival as an independent entity
was in the financial interest of shareholders, as well as being in the public
interest. 20 6 Nevertheless, it is important to see that the value assigned to
Time's editorial independence extended beyond mere shareholder financial interest to include a claim that Time's fate had much broader social
and political significance. Allen thus read the record before him as revealing that "the 'Time culture' importantly includes directors' concerns
for the larger role of the enterprise in society. '20 7
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974).
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,514.
See id. at 93,272-73 & n.8.
Ia at 93,267.
Id.
Ia at 93,269.
Id.
Ia
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To explain why preservation of Time's corporate structure in its existing form was significant, Allen might have referred to the maintenance
of jobs or of business relationships with creditors, suppliers, and others
dependent on Time's continued existence. However, neither his nor the
supreme court's opinion said anything explicit about such concerns. In
fact, the viability of some of these relationships may well have been
threatened by Time's assumption of an enormous debt burden needed to
effectuate the renegotiated Warner transaction. Instead, the importance
of "Time culture," and thus the justification for management's efforts to
preserve the corporation intact, lay in the public's interest in the ongoing
operation of the business in more or less the same manner as it had been
conducted during recent decades. Disruption or destruction of Time's
business would be harmful to the American public, so management's efforts to preserve it, by merging with Warner and blocking the Paramount tender offer, were justified.
Allen nodded to Paramount's insistence that "this claim of 'culture'
[amounted to] nothing more than a desire to perpetuate or entrench existing management disguised in a pompous, highfalutin' claim. ' 20 8 He
acknowledged that management of any corporation could assert the
firm's distinctiveness to justify its desire to perpetuate the status quo.
Nevertheless, Allen was "not persuaded that there may not be instances
in which the law might recognize as valid a perceived threat to a 'corporate culture' that is shown to be palpable (for lack of a better word),
distinctive and advantageous. ' '209 Here, then, Allen seemed to agree that
the preservation of the corporate enterprise's independence may be of
public significance. Under such circumstances, a threat to that independence may justify management's defensive response under Unocal, regardless of shareholder preferences to the contrary. These ideas may
therefore explain Allen's conclusion that, "where the board.., continues
to manage the corporation for long-term profit pursuant to a preexisting
business plan that itself is not primarily a control device or scheme, the
2 10
corporation has a legally cognizable interest in achieving that plan.
208. Id at 93,267.
209. Id
210. Id. at 93,283. Having applied the first element of Unocal in this manner, Allen readily
disposed of the second, holding that the response was reasonable in relation to the threat presented
because the objective was of "great importance .... Moreover, the reactive step taken was effective
but not overly broad.... That 'defensive' step does not legally preclude the successful prosecution
of a hostile tender offer." Id at 93,284.
The supreme court's opinion, like Allen's, includes several references to "Time Culture." See
Fed. See. L. Rep. 94, 938, at 95,203 & n.4, 95,204, 95,206, 95,207, 95,209. The court does not,
however, indicate how-if at all-that concept and its public interest significance relate to the
court's Unocal analysis.
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In seeming to rely on a public interest justification for target man-

agement's defensive measures, Allen may have been influenced by a belief in the unique social and political importance of magazines like Time,
Life, and the other periodicals in the Time stable. Perhaps the decision
should be read narrowly to apply only to media firms whose operations

have an arguably significant public interest dimension. 211 Would Allen

have considered the same argument to be credible in, say, the recent hostile bid for Dunkin' Donuts?2 12 It is tempting to assume that he would

have dismissed the notion of a distinctively valuable "Dunkin' Donuts
culture." However, a broader reading of Time is possible. Such a reading would see the decision as an endorsement of corporate management's
power to favor stability and gradual adaptation to consumer preferences

over short-term shareholder gain, rather than an acknowledgement of
the substantive merits of Time's products. Under that reading, the question is not whether Dunkin' Donuts products are any less nutritive than
Time's. Instead, one might emphasize that the donut shops are just as
firm a fixture of American life as Time Magazine is. Thus, management

of any substantial company that has become an established feature of the
business landscape and on which the public has come to rely may be
entitled to protect the corporation from the disruptive and potentially
ruinous impact of a hostile takeover---even though self-preservation

comes at the expense of a robust market for corporate control and its
21 3
attendant benefits to shareholders.

211. Cf Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972) (allowing defensive response to
effort to take over newspaper corporation described as a "quasi-public institution," owing responsibilities to public readership as well as to stockholders and employees).
212. See Takeover Defenses of Dunkin' Donuts are Cleared by Court, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1989,
§ 2, at 2, col. 3.
213. One might criticize Allen's reliance on target management as the vehicle of achieving this
objective on the ground that self-interest rather than public interest is likely to shape management's
response to a hostile bid. However, existing doctrine severely limits the means available for restricting hostile takeovers on public interest grounds. State legislators lack the power directly to restrict
the level of takeover activity, for example, by imposing administrative review requirements on proposed hostile bids. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (declaring unconstitutional Illinois Business Take Over Act, which required a tender offeror to notify secretary of state and submit
to administrative review of hostile bid). Instead, antitakeover rules must be adopted under the guise
of the state's traditional jurisdiction over corporate internal affairs. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of Indiana statute restricting voting rights of
hostile bidders). Thus, in all their various manifestations, state anti-takeover laws operate either by
empowerment of target company shareholders or of management. For discussion of this "corporatization" strategy, see Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 1862,
1873-82 (1989). The more recent statutes that redefine management's duty of care to encompass
non-shareholders as well as shareholders exemplify this development most graphically. See supra
text accompanying notes 130-31. In the same vein, Allen's recognition of the public dimension of
hostile takeovers takes the form of an endorsement of management resistance to an unwelcome bid
under circumstances in which public interest makes such resistance appropriate.
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Turning from Allen's opinion itself to its theoretical foundations,
one noteworthy feature is the absence of explicit attention to the theory
of the corporation that underlies its analysis. It seems clear that Allen
sees the corporate enterprise as more that just its shareholders. Furthermore, talking about the public significance of corporate activity (rather
than the activity of the corporation's constituent elements) could be
taken to imply an entity conception. Yet, rather than attempting to derive consequences from a particular theory of the corporation, Allen focuses (at least in part) on management's concerns about the public
impact of the takeover as a source of legitimacy for its conduct. Allen in
effect treats corporate law as public law because the American public (as
consumers and citizens, as well as employees and providers of goods and
services) has a genuine and legitimate interest in how takeover contests
should be resolved. Rather than trying to tease out the implications of a
particular theory of what corporations are, Allen goes directly to the
heart of what has been the most important question all along: What doctrinal solution best accommodates the many interests that are at stake?
Under the approach he takes, nothing turns on the entity-aggregate, natural-artificial distinctions that have characterized so much thinking
about corporate law.
Allen's apparent willingness to bring a public interest perspective to
bear on the law governing hostile takeovers takes the shape it does because, among the three alternative theoretical justifications for management's conduct available to him, two are inadequate. Under the first
theory, one can expand the concept of the corporate aggregation so that
it embraces those non-shareholders whom one wishes to protect. This is
intellectually feasible if the concern is the interests of employees or creditors or other groups with direct connections to the corporate enterprise.
Chayes' and Summers' arguments in favor of employee participation in
corporate governance exemplify this approach. 2 14 If, however, one is
also concerned about consumers or the general public, to redraw the
boundary of the corporation broadly enough to encompass these constituencies threatens to dissolve the line between the corporation and the
rest of the world. The normative implications are then ambiguous. If
the corporate aggregation is so broad that it blends into the general public, is corporate law then assigned the task of regulating all of the relaOne might also argue that Allen limits the Time decision to cases in which target management
is proceeding with pre-existing, good faith, independent business purposes. It would not apply to the
more common situation in which management resistance is by way of refusal to redeem a poison pill.
See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514, at 93,284 n.22. Given all that went before it, however, that distinction seems highly unpersuasive. See Johnson & Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. - (forthcoming 1990).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05, 130.
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tionships implicated by corporate activity? Corporate law has never had
that ambitious an agenda and it is hard to imagine how, as a practical
matter, it might. Expanding the aggregation also might support a different normative conclusion, however. As we have seen, the neoclassical
nexus-of-contracts theorists have dissolved the corporation by viewing
relations among participants in the corporate enterprise as no different
from market transactions. 215 Under this view, corporate law is nothing
but a branch of contract law, from which it is said to follow that regulation in the public interest is an illegitimate interference with freedom of
contract. Non-shareholders can bargain for whatever protections they
desire. Thus, the ambiguous implications of defining the corporate aggregation expansively render that approach ill-suited to one concerned
about public harms of unregulated takeover activity.
A second justification for regulation in the public interest relies on
the states' constitutive role in granting the privilege of incorporation. As
the creator of the corporation, the state is at least presumptively free to
impose whatever regulations or restrictions it deems to be appropriate.
Thinking of the corporation as an artificial construct was a conceptual
basis for the regulation of business activity through corporate law during
the 19th century. 216 It also may lie behind recent anti-takeover legislation. While it is possible that this idea also informs Allen's Time opinion, any such influence is unarticulated. In light of the now standard
view that state corporate law is primarily enabling rather than regulatory, the utility of this theory is problematic.
Under my reading of Time, Allen instead takes a third approach to
the accommodation of public interest concerns within corporate law.
From this perspective, one simply focuses on the social impact of corporate activity. Where corporate decisions have broad effects on constituencies beyond the shareholders themselves (as in hostile takeovers),
corporations may not be required to make those decisions in a manner
that disregards those consequences. How one defines the corporation
under this approach makes no difference. Even if the corporation is defined solely in terms of its shareholders, public interest is assigned a
higher priority than short-term shareholder welfare.
Because Allen and the supreme court do not feel obliged to rely on a
particular theory of what corporations are, the promise of the Time case
may be the promise of corporate law based explicitly on public policy
considerations divorced from arguments about what corporations are.
Perhaps Time represents a tacit, unconscious acknowledgement that particular theories of the corporation fail to offer much in the way of con215. See supra Part II.C.3.
216. See supra Part II.A.
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crete guidance about how corporate law ought to respond to important
policy questions. In other words, corporate theory is not determinate
enough to warrant extended analysis of its normative implications. Perhaps too, Time recognizes the emptiness of the public-private distinction
that has so long structured our thinking about the appropriate goals and
content of corporate law. The decision to treat particular conduct as
private and therefore immune from regulation in the public interest is, of
course, a public policy determination. In any event, so-called private activity always takes place within a framework of legal rules justified by
their social, public utility. The legal realists made these points long
2 17

ago.

Nevertheless, anti-regulation commentators (like Milton Friedman 2 18 and his cousins, the nexus-of-contracts theorists) continue to insist that the public-private distinction is meaningful and that important
normative implications follow from it.219 If corporate law is to focus
solely on the financial interests of shareholders, let the proponents of this
point of view tell us why, without wasting energy on the ambiguous implications of the claim that corporations are aggregations of private contracts. Read generously, Time implies that all corporate law must take
into account its public dimension, and thus corporate law is public law.
Particular theories of the corporation should no longer provide a screen
behind which to hide from this truth.
V.

CONCLUSION

Chancellor Allen's apparent recognition in Time of the public's interest in the law governing corporate activity, and the corresponding legitimacy of reshaping corporate law accordingly, is a potentially
profound departure from the shareholder primacy, private law regime of
the last half century. Whether this new approach will come to dominate
the law governing corporate takeovers and whether it will extend beyond
takeovers to other areas of corporate law remains to be seen. The destabilizing force of a decision like Time seems difficult to ignore.220 Yet
even if commentators, lawyers, and judges balk at Time's implications,
statutes like those redefining the board's fiduciary duties to take nonshareholders into account 22 1 already present significant theoretical challenges. How these challenges are interpreted will determine the charac217. See Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV . L. REV. 553, 558-65 (1933); Cohen, Property
and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 21-26 (1927); Hale, Coercionand Distributionin a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
219. See supra Part II.C.3 and text accompanying notes 142-52.
220. See Johnson & Milon, supra note 213.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
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ter of corporate law's posture toward business activity in the years to
come.
Like the new statutes that redefine management's fiduciary duty to
include various non-shareholder constituencies, Allen's Time opinion is
particularly intriguing because of its reshaping of conventional corporate
law discourse in a manner that implies a striking departure from standard shareholder primacy assumptions and the private law theory of the
corporation on which they are based. As such it exemplifies the creative
potential inherent within corporate theory and doctrine. However determinate legal theories or rules might appear (once they have been interpreted in particular ways that have become generally accepted), at any
point in time the constraints of conventional understanding are subject to
internal critique and potentially radical revision. For the critical scholar
and practitioner alike, attention to the ways in which this process of critique and revision works in concrete situations is likely to be far more
fruitful than abstract debates about whether and to what extent interpretive conventions determine our legal and social practices.
Conservative scholars have trouble even imagining corporate law in
other than the privatized, shareholder-centered framework in which it
has been thought of for much of this century. They note correctly that
assimilation into corporate law of non-shareholder interests and a public
law perspective would radically alter existing theory and doctrine. Yet
history should remind us that there is nothing inevitable about orthodoxy. Ideas about what corporations are, and the normative implications that follow from those ideas, have changed radically over time.
Likewise, basic assumptions about the purposes and appropriate content
of corporate law have differed in the past. In the face of the hostile takeover phenomenon, these assumptions seem to be changing again. Confronted with important political challenges, theories of the corporation
have always been fundamentally indeterminate. Critics of orthodox corporate law must avoid the conservatives' false equation of convention
and necessity.

